



# Marine Corps Gazette

MARCH 1950

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**THIS MONTH'S COVER:** Veterans of Peleliu will recognize this picture taken during the amphibious assault of that enemy-infested island. Showing conventional World War II landing craft loaded with Marines in the foreground, the picture is almost typical of what might be called "the old way" of getting troops ashore. For a discussion of a new way and an examination of the helicopter as a new tool of sea power, turn to page 14 for LtCol J. D. Hittle's full treatment on the subject of the transport helicopter.

## THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

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**THIS MONTH AND NEXT**—Infantrymen overrunning the Ruhr is the only thing that stopped German steel production in World War II, Dr James A. Huston declares in *Air Power and the German War Economy*, beginning on page 22 of this issue. Dr Huston points out a number of misconceptions concerning the effect of bombing on Nazi production and counters them with survey statistics which reveal that despite continuously increased aerial attack the Germans were able to increase production of needed supplies far beyond Allied intelligence estimates.

A type of operation little known to Americans in World War II will be featured in the April GAZETTE. In *Ab Initio* Col A. G. Ferguson-Warren, Royal Marines, recounts the unusual experiences connected with his assignment as contact man and guide for British units trapped behind the German lines at Dunkirk. His article will run in two installments.

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## A STORY WITH AN O. HENRY ENDING

# The Telephone Operator who Saved a Life

JUST AS HER OWN LIFE HAD BEEN  
SAVED TWENTY YEARS BEFORE BY  
ANOTHER OPERATOR

*(From a recent broadcast of the radio  
program, "The Telephone Hour.")*

**T**WENTY years ago in the busy town of Vineland, New Jersey, Nicholas and Tessie Pennino and their two-year-old daughter, Marjorie, were nearly asphyxiated by coal gas fumes from a stove in their home. Mother and daughter were both unconscious when Mr. Pennino managed to crawl to the telephone and ask faintly for help before he, too, was overcome by the deadly fumes.



Miss Marjorie Pennino and Tom Shirley, radio announcer. Miss Pennino received an ovation from the studio audience when she was introduced after the radio broadcast.

A fast-thinking telephone operator for the New Jersey Bell Telephone Company received his call, realized something was wrong, and notified a doctor. Because of that operator's alertness, baby Marjorie and her parents recovered.

But that's not the end. There's a sequel—a sequel that was played nearly twenty years later. It took place in the same kind of setting—a home filled with poisonous gas—a weak voice calling into a telephone for help, and a telephone operator on the other end who knew just what to do. The cast was different except for the principal player. For this time the operator who traced the desperate call, found the

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exact location of the house, and notified the police in a matter of minutes, was none other than Marjorie Pennino.

Yes, Marjorie Pennino had grown up and joined the Telephone Company shortly after her graduation from Vineland High School. And so twenty years later, by the same kind of quick thinking that had helped to save her own life, Marjorie helped to save the life of another.

A story with an O. Henry twist, yes! But a true one! And one we think is a pretty good illustration of how telephone people like to give "that extra touch of helpfulness."

# WHAT'S DOING

We've just been reviewing some figures to see what happened at Pratt & Whitney Aircraft during 1949.

One thing that happened was that we continued to build and deliver substantial quantities of aircraft engines. During the year, we were in production on six basic sizes of piston engines for both military and commercial use. As you know, we also swung into production on our first jet engine, the Turbo-Wasp. All told, we shipped more than 2,400 engines in 1949.

There was a lot of work, a lot of planning, and a lot of headaches involved in this manufacturing accomplishment. On the piston engines, for example, quantity orders by our customers for various models of engines fluctuated abnormally during the year, requiring repeated revision of our production schedules. Then too, we made thousands of design improvements in these production models, requiring new tooling and changes in manufacturing methods. On the jet engines, of course, we were plagued by all the inevitable troubles involved in putting any completely new product into production. Despite the problems, we delivered almost 7,000,000 horsepower in engines, and the equivalent of 40% additional horsepower in spare parts.

But the physical production of engines wasn't the only thing that happened at Pratt & Whitney during 1949. In fact, there wouldn't have been *any* production if those engines hadn't possessed the superior performance characteristics and the dependability that brought orders from our customers. So, an intensive engineering program of research, design, development and test has always been the mainstay of our progress at Pratt & Whitney. Out of it has already come the improved performance of our current types of engines. And out of it will soon come still better Pratt & Whitney engines to meet the rapidly advancing requirements of both military and commercial operators.

# at Pratt & Whitney Aircraft?

## HOW MUCH ENGINEERING WORK DID WE DO LAST YEAR?

- 1 Million Man-Hours?
- 2 Million Man-Hours?
- 3 Million Man-Hours?
- ? Million Man-Hours?



Last year, Pratt & Whitney engineers put in a total of nearly 3,000,000 man-hours of work. That's equivalent to the full time of one man working 50 weeks a year for 1,500 years! Actually, of course, no one man could ever do the work if he lived a million years. The engineering problems are so complex and varied that our engineering staff consists of designers, draftsmen, mathematicians, metallurgists, physicists and countless other specialists, each contributing his technical knowledge and skill to the solution of some part of the problems. To all this time and effort must then be added more millions of man-hours by expert craftsmen, working directly for the engineering department to fabricate, assemble and test the experimental parts and engines required for new designs.

## HOW MANY DESIGN CHANGES WERE MADE DURING THE YEAR?

- 3,831?
- 11,417?
- 19,000?
- 52,000?



The design of an aircraft engine is never finished until that engine becomes obsolete and goes out of production. It must be constantly refined and improved — either to provide better performance, or to reduce manufacturing time and cost, or to correct troubles encountered in actual service. Just as an example, we made 3,831 engineering changes on production models of Pratt & Whitney engines during 1949 — an average of 15 changes every working day. This involved changing more than 19,000 drawings. And these are only the changes that applied to production models of engines. Beyond this, the engineering department changed an additional 11,417 drawings applying to experimental engines. Add to these figures the 21,999 brand-new drawings and design layouts turned out for experimental engines, and you get a grand total of more than 52,000 drawings that were either made or changed during the year — an average of more than 1,000 every week.

## HOW MUCH EXPERIMENTAL TESTING DID WE DO IN 1949?

- 10,000 Hours?
- 18,000 Hours?
- 52,000 Hours?
- 70,000 Hours?



Every time a new part is designed, we have to make sure it will function properly. Every time we change an existing part we have to find out if the change produces the desired improvement. And every time operating troubles develop in service, we have to find out the source of the trouble. This involves a continuous program of experimental testing both of individual parts and of completed engines. In addition to almost a thousand hours of flight testing, we carried out, last year, more than 70,000 hours of such experimental testing. This included more than 18,000 hours of testing of full-scale experimental engines and more than 50,000 hours of test-stand running of major components such as cylinders, burners, turbines and compressors.



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TO THE EDITOR

## Message Center

**Joe Blow . . .**

DEAR SIR:

I have always listened with interest when someone comes up with statistics about how many men would rather do this instead of that, how many more yards one great team gained than another, what per cent of the troops go on liberty, etc., and now in the December *GAZETTE* I have come across a figure which interests me and also has caused me to be dubious about. It appeared in the story, *Joe Blow—Morale Builder*. Under one of the sub-titles, *How It Affects the Marine*, it stated that 75 per cent of the men in the Marine Corps enlisted for the purpose of travel and adventure. Where did the authors procure this figure? In questioning, I was told that the authors may have asked four Marines and three answered that they joined for that purpose thereby giving the 75 per cent conclusion to this alleged survey.

Even tho' it does sound adventurous and Marine-like, in my opinion the percentage shown does not reflect the main reason many men have enlisted.

WALTER A. BANDYK,  
MSgt, USMC

ED.: For a reply to your question, the *GAZETTE* wrote to the authors of *Joe Blow* and received the following answer:

DEAR SIR:

The figure quoted in our article *Joe Blow—Morale Builder*, (75 per cent of the men still enlist for travel and adventure) was obtained in the same manner George Gallup obtains his figures—polls.

The first poll was taken in St. Louis during 1946, '47, and '48 while MSgt Stolley was on recruiting duty with the Mid-western Recruiting Division. Another poll was taken unofficially during the past year while interviewing in the Norfolk area for hometown news releases.

It will be remembered that during 1946, '47, and the early part of 1948, the prod of the Draft Law was not in effect. Those who gyrated to the Marine Corps recruiting offices through their own volition, or by the gentle urging of the recruiters, had a definite reason for applying for enlistment in the Marine Corps.

Very early it was found that the reasons for application as set forth on the official application forms, were not in reality the motivating impulse that brought the men into the office. Therefore, if the advertising campaign was slanted in the

direction indicated by the official application blanks the Marine Corps appeal would fall on barren ground.

Therefore, after the man was accepted and waiting to entrain for "boot" camp, he would be engaged in conversation by a staff NCO. In the course of the conversation, and after the man had relaxed the recruiter would probe for the "real" reason.

It was found that many of the men who wrote "education" as the reason for their enlistment, thought that it "looked good" on the application blank, and knowing that the Marine Corps was after the higher type young man, surmised they would receive more consideration if they gave as their reason, *education*.

When they were pinned down, in an "off the record" bull session most of them would admit that they came into the Marine Corps because they wanted to travel around and see a few things before they settled down.

In addition they said that everyone knew that the Marine Corps was always the first outfit to get into action. What then is this, but adventure?

Taking this poll to heart the advertising appeal was changed to the travel and adventure theme, and if the records will be consulted it will be found that the St. Louis Recruiting District was one of the few districts in the United States who filled their quota in the dark recruiting days of December 1947, and January, February, and March of 1948.

The poll taken in the Norfolk area followed the same pattern, but if there be those among you who still doubt that 75 per cent of the men do not enlist for travel and adventure then dig down and examine your own reasons for selecting the Marine Corps. This is "off the record," now . . . why did you choose the Corps?

KARL D. MORRISON  
2dLt, USMC  
F. T. STOLLEY  
MSgt, USMC

**Royal Welch Fusiliers . . .**

DEAR SIR:

Shades of Lord Herbert of Cherbury and his successors as COs of the Royal Welch Fusiliers! It may seem a small matter to a type setter or a proof reader, but spelling "Welch" with an "s" as was done in *The Invisible Asset* by Maj Reginald Hargreaves in the December *GAZETTE*, is anathema to that regiment. Recently joined younger officers have been



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known to be sent off battalion parade because their buttons read "Welsh" instead of "Welch."

Recognition of this regimental peculiarity came when official permission to spell "Welch" with a "c" was given in a special Army Order in 1919.

*The Invisible Asset* is an excellent article by a man who knows morale, but I would have liked to see mention of the U. S. Marine Corps as an outstanding example of esprit de corps, in spite of the fact that it is an exception to the author's thesis that such spirit is difficult to maintain in units larger than regiments. However, in the main he is correct and his article could be read with benefit by the policy makers for our brothers in the Army where they are dealing with men in the millions.

CAMPBELL R. COXE,  
Maj, USMCR

ED.: This is indeed a regrettable, if unintentional, error. The word "Welsh" was used in the article exactly as it was written in the original manuscript by Maj Hargreaves. The GAZETTE herewith apologizes for the error and hopes that no Royal Welch Fusilier was miffed by it. For the record, the Marine Corps and the Royal Welch Fusiliers have a bond of mutual understanding which dates back to the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900. At that time the 1st Marines and the Royal *Welsh* Fusiliers fought side by side in the attack on the walled city of Tientsin. It long since has become a tradition for the Commandant of the Marine Corps to salute the Royal Welch Fusiliers each year on March 1st with this greeting: "And Saint David." The quotation is an ancient Welsh password. Saint David is, of course, the patron saint of the Welsh and March 1st is celebrated in Wales as Saint David's Day. Maj Hargreaves is a GAZETTE subscriber. Perhaps he will favor us with a reply to your last paragraph.

### Mortars and Smoke . . .

DEAR SIR:

Although I applaud LtCol Aplington's admirable piece, *Mortars and Smoke* (September 1949), I shall have to take issue with one of its opening statements (as regards two operations, at any rate):

"Tarawa, the Marshalls, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Omaha Beach showed us that beach defenses, well prepared and defended by a stubborn enemy, are not reduced by pre-landing air and naval gunfire preparations; no matter how much metal is dropped on or fired at the defenses, the assaulting infantry must fight its way through with grenades, demolitions, and . . . crew served weapons." (Italics supplied)

That statement could stand as gospel for Tarawa, Peleliu, and Omaha Beach, but certainly not for the Marshalls or for Iwo.

Land casualties and opposition in the Marshalls, both at Roi-Namur and Kwajalein Island, were among the lightest in the Pacific War, a situation directly attributable to the care-



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fully planned, massive air and naval gunfire preparations (together with some artillery from offshore islands on D-Day).

In the case of Iwo Jima, otherwise probably the most bitterly contested battle of the Pacific war, let us consult the action reports of the assault units:

*RCT 28:* "Landing waves received only light mortar fire. . . LT 1-28 (the assault landing team) did not meet heavy resistance on the beach."

*RCT 27:* "Initial resistance was light."

*RCT 23:* "Enroute to the beach, the landing craft received no fire."

*RCT 25:* ". . . Very little fire placed on the leading waves. . . ."

*V Amphibious Corps* "The preliminary bombardment destroyed or damaged the majority of the beach defenses and allowed the landing to be made. . . ."

It appears to me, as a generalization, that LtCol Aplington takes a position which the results of Tarawa justified (and was well expressed in the now well-known summation of the results of that battle, given at Quantico by Gen Edson)—but one which events and the development of naval gunfire support very definitely backdated within less than a year, as LtGen Kuribayashi, the very able Japanese defender of Iwo Jima testified:

"However firm and stout pillboxes you may build at the beach, they will be destroyed by bombardment of main armament of the battleships. . . The beach positions we made on this island by using many materials, days and great efforts, were destroyed within three days."

Gen Kuribayashi's observations found confirmation in the

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
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
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instructions of the Commanding General, Japanese 32d Army, whose Okinawa defense order included the following:

"... generally speaking, we must make it our basic principle to allow the enemy to land in full. . . Until he penetrates our positions and . . . cannot receive cover and support from naval gunfire and aerial bombardment, we must patiently and prudently hold our fire."

Thus it seems to be a matter of historical record that pre-landing air and naval gunfire bombardment not only can, but in fact did reduce beach defenses well prepared and defended by stubborn enemy troops in two major Pacific campaigns, while the very threat of such pre-landing bombardment prevented a third great battle from being contested on the beaches.

ROBERT D. HEINL, JR.,  
LtCol, USMC

#### Professional Examinations . . .

DEAR SIR:

In the November issue of the GAZETTE there appeared a letter regarding "professional examinations" written by Ray N. Joens, 1stLt, USMC. The Lieutenant states that under the peacetime setup, officers are selected for promotion by the various selection boards convened for that purpose, and that such officers after having been selected are then required to

take the officer's professional examination covering a multiplicity of subjects. For the examination, the officer must procure, read, and retain the knowledge contained in several professional manuals and publications. The candidate officer then sits down and struggles through the examination.

Discounting the political aspects of the situation, a moral weakness and a thought disease from which all humanity suffers, I take the vulnerable position of submitting my thoughts pertaining to professional examinations.

I strongly question the merit of any examination classified as professional in nature which requires, to obtain satisfactory grading, the last minute "cramming" and "feverish" review of material in the testing field, in order that the candidate may repeat this material from memory in the examination room. These types of examinations make no provision for a candidate's thought expressions nor for analytical solutions and are merely a test of his memorizing ability, with no similarity to a professional examination.

It is my belief that a great many examiners have missed the point by failing to be more discriminatory in their selection of material for professional examinations. Certain elementary facts have been established and are the basic tools for the military profession. When a man has reached the point where he is selected to sit for the professional examination, he should

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*Income figures used above are based on 1949 dividends, excluding extras. Our commissions on these purchases range from \$6 on 10 shares of General Motors to \$13.05 on 50 shares of Virginia Electric & Power. Stock prices are as of January 25, 1950.*

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# SIKORSKY Helicopter NEWS

SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT  
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It was only ten years ago that this country's first helicopter, the Sikorsky VS-300, made aviation history by rising a few inches off the ground. It carried only one man - Igor Sikorsky. But it was the beginning of a story of leadership, of pioneering in a new field.

Now, just ten years later, the newest and largest of a long line of successful Sikorsky helicopters has completed its flight tests and is now in production. Designated the H-19 for the Air Force, this latest helicopter can carry ten passengers (or eight litter patients) plus a crew of two.

In addition to the traditional Sikorsky ruggedness, it combines many important advances in helicopter performance, dependability, maintenance and ease of handling on the ground and in the air.

Known commercially as the S-55, the craft has a top speed of well over 100 miles per hour and a service ceiling of about 13,000 feet. With auxiliary tanks, it has a ferry range of approximately 1,000 miles.

Constant pioneering in research and development work brought this latest helicopter to the production line at Sikorsky Aircraft. And this is still only the beginning. The pioneering goes on and on.

SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT

Bridgeport, Connecticut

already have these basic elementary tools at his command, and the determination of whether he is qualified as a professional man should be made on the manner and method with which he applies these basic tools in the profession. The separation point between a professional and a non-professional man is not necessarily the ability to recite from memory these elementary basic facts, but rather the ability to take a problem in military science on a previously unencountered problem and to present a keen and analytical solution, however far it may be from a recognized solution.

No amount of coaching and training can teach a mature man to think. Thinking is a process of applying basic elementary facts in a successful professional practice. This process is cultivated from childhood with steady improvement commensurate with the individual's development and cannot be developed in one year or after reaching maturity.

A "pseudo professional man" who recites and makes decisions on situations by memory, based on his familiarity with a similar situation, or who even gives the recognized "school solution" should be eliminated from the profession. He is not a member of the profession simply because he knows the statistics relative to the size, weight, etc., of the tools of the profession. These are fundamental basic facts that can be learned by memory, and a man should not be rewarded by allowing him into a profession merely because he can memorize something.

In the case of the bar examination, a candidate takes the examination and his solutions may be entirely foreign to the law. However, should he be able to present a solution supported by a good legal analysis of the subject, he will be rewarded. The bar exam may cover all phases of law; however, a candidate will be tested on only a few. Law is an ever-changing science regulating human conduct and human conduct changes from day to day. Therefore, it would not only be impractical, but impossible to give a professional examination relative to the laws governing society and expect a candidate to come up with an established solution. However, society can at any time test the candidate's process of legal thinking. Society can also present for his study, material for developing his legal thinking and philosophy, but a fair test of his professional ability will not be made by testing his ability to memorize this material.

It is my belief that mere objective testing for a profession with an examination to which predetermined solutions have been established, and requiring the candidate to come up with similar solutions, is an extremely questionable practice and leaves much to be desired in the determination of the competency of the candidate for the profession.

No amount of schooling or any other training program should give a candidate answers that would be satisfactory to good professional examinations. However, training courses can be initiated that would illustrate and guide the candidate in cultivating the type of analytical thinking and philosophy that is required by the profession. When the candidate has demon-

strated his command of these qualities in the examination room, then he should be granted the privilege of entering the profession.

This letter is intended to provoke further comment from interested parties regarding the subject of professional examination and testing.

GRANVILLE K. HERSHY, JR.,  
1stLt, USMCR.

#### Cheer for Kuppenheimer . . .

DEAR SIR:

I have just recently read the December issue of the GAZETTE and believe *Speaking For Myself* by Kuppenheimer deserves a cheer. The article seems to have been well prepared and definitely hits the nail right on the head. During my active duty service I saw many instances as described in this story and find the same problems ever present in the Reserves. Under a program of one night a week the men in the Reserves without previous military service don't learn the true meaning of responsibility and discipline.

I feel that the article should be read by every Marine in both the regular and reserve outfits for it is really important that an NCO be given the responsibility and respect commensurate with his rank. And it is just as important that each individual be familiar with the job and responsibilities to which he hopes one day to be promoted.

ROBERT A. GOTTCENT,  
MSgt, USMCR

#### GAZETTE Articles . . .

DEAR SIR:

Compliments to the GAZETTE on the fine February issue! I believe your magazine is really setting the pace for professional military magazines, both in quality of articles and in attractiveness of layout. Your story *The Secret of Quebec* was especially interesting. I hope I am not asking too much, but can you run a few more stories with a similar adventure angle to them.

HOWARD PETTIT,  
1stLt, USMCR.

ED.: Thanks for your kind words. In reply to your question, we are planning to run an adventure-type story beginning in the April GAZETTE, to come in two installments. We are sure you will agree after reading the first few pages of the first section that the second installment will be worth waiting for. The title is *Ab Initio* and, although it reads like fiction, it is a true story. It might be well to say at this time that what we would like to print each issue and what we have on hand in the way of articles are two different things. We have no staff writers. We depend entirely upon our contributors.



**DELIVERY —**

# *Via the Air Route*

The Military Air Transport Service (MATS) contributes to the mobility of the Armed Forces by airlifting cargo and personnel *whenever* and *wherever* needed to fulfill national military requirements.

Fairchild C-119 Packets, soon to be flying for the Military Air Transport Service, help fulfill this vital air transportation mission. Capable of carrying 64 passengers or 10 tons of cargo, this twin-engine transport and cargo plane has the *versatility* to accomplish numerous types of operations required via the MATS Air Route.


The C-119's unique rear loading at truck-bed

height allows for rapid handling of cargo, eliminating the necessity for extra ground handling equipment. Airplane engines and parts, bulky communication equipment, vehicles, tanks and field kitchens are some of the many military items the Fairchild C-119 carries with ease. In addition to its utility as a cargo plane, the Packet is equally efficient for air-evacuation, air-sea rescue, and personnel transport.

The C-119 is one of a series of Fairchild transport planes which will continue to play a versatile role in the operations of the world wide Military Air Transport Service.

ENGINE AND AIRPLANE CORPORATION  
**FAIRCHILD** *Aircraft Division*  
HAGERSTOWN, MARYLAND

# The Transport Helicopter



**NEW TOOL OF SEA POWER**

**By using transport helicopters in early stages of the ship-to-shore movement, the fleet will offer a poor target for Hydrogen and Atom bombs. Combined air and sea landings will give the amphibious attack a much greater flexibility than before**

• TODAY, WHEN THERE IS SUCH AN EAGERNESS IN SOME quarters to apply the label of obsolescence to our nation's war proven concepts of sea power, U. S. naval power has acquired a new weapon, a new technique, and a new strength that adds up to a major contribution to national security.

This new enhancing of our war potential results from the development of and use of the transport helicopter as an air vehicle for effecting the ship to shore movement of assault elements in an amphibious operation. Viewed in its many aspects, the carrier-based transport helicopter is far more than another kind of flying machine. It is a new concept in the conduct of war. The revolutionary importance of the development of the carrier-based ship to shore helicopter stems from the following considerations:

- (a) It gives a new flexibility to the amphibious assault.
- (b) It combines the versatility of the airborne assault with the unsurpassed range and strategic mobility of U. S. sea power.
- (c) It gives a practical answer to those who have said that amphibious operations cannot be successfully conducted in the so-called atomic age.

From the early amphibious operations of the Mediterranean world until the huge and highly complicated landings in World War II, all amphibious assaults had one very basic common characteristic: the water line. This was the land-water boundary that every man, weapon, and item of supply had to cross. It was the constant factor of all amphibious operations, for it marked a line that every attacker must pass in the conduct of the sea-borne attack. As such, the water line assumed understandable importance in amphibious planning, both from the standpoint of the defense and the offense.

Regardless of the technological and doctrinal advances in the conduct of amphibious operations or of the defense against them, the offensive plan always had to provide for the surface crossing of the water line. Likewise, to the defender, irrespective of how much or how little he knew about the attacker's plans, it was certain that if there was to be an amphibious assault, that assault had to move from the water onto the beach. No matter how insufficient was the defender's intelligence, as long as an attack was expected the defense could be certain that assault forces would have to cross the water line at some

point. This consideration has exerted a definite influence on all plans for defense against attack from the sea.

This frontal and surface approach to the water line remained a major factor of all amphibious assault plans. Regardless of the weapons, the forces and the scheme of maneuver involved, attacking forces could not avoid the necessity of becoming landborne instead of waterborne immediately upon crossing the water line. The abrupt transition from water to terrain has continually constituted a critical part of every amphibious assault. It has called for the beaching of boats, deployment of troops for the assault inland, and for the establishment of a logistic agency for handling equipment and supplies brought from seaward for use ashore. Above all, however, was the realization that the entire landing force strength had to build up from nothing initially at the water line. From this initial zero strength ashore the weight of the attack had to be progressively enlarged by bringing more and more men and material across the line that physically divided the land and the sea.

• FROM the defender's standpoint these basic considerations meant that the attack would have to move inland from the shore, and the attacker's approach would have to be across the terrain. Thus the attack and defense, as far as the defending and assault troops were concerned, was two dimensional.


Advent of the carrier-based transport helicopter now brings the third dimension to the sea to shore assault. No longer is the amphibious attack restricted to a surface movement across the water line and a progressive movement inland from the shore. These heretofore ever-present considerations of the amphibious assault no longer are invariable factors in view of the new flexibility introduced by the employment of the troop carrying helicopter as a ship to shore vehicle. The tactical implications are significant.

No longer can the defender base a large measure of his plan on the certain fact that the attacking troops must move across the water line on the surface and fight a terrestrial operation toward their objective. No longer can the defensive plan be predicated on the fact that the attacker will begin with zero strength at the water line

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*By LtCol J. D. Hittle*

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and move progressively inland, building up power as the attack moves inland from the shore. Now, with the seaborne attacking force possessing means of making a vertical envelopment via the transport helicopter, the role of those who have to defend against an amphibious operation is far from enviable. Not only must that defender guard against attack by frontal assault or by movement against or around a flank — the only basic maneuvers possible in previous conventional surface assaults — but now *any* position in the beachhead area is subject to immediate attack by helicopter-borne troops.

To the defense this means that coast defense guns, inshore mine fields, underwater obstacles, as well as other customary beach defenses have lost some of their importance. Instead of going through these defenses, the assault troops can now go over them. And the defense problem now becomes not only one of defense against amphibious surface assault according to the previous pattern, but also a defense against attack from the air as well.

To the attacker, the use of the transport helicopter means that the direct surface approach to beachhead objectives can be made without initially running the gauntlet of enemy mines, antiaircraft guns, and obstacles. Seizure of key positions by helicopter-borne assault troops will greatly modify the principle that the assault strength builds up from an initial zero at the water's edge. The landing of assault elements in and behind the enemy defenses will be designed to facilitate seizure of inshore positions to permit subsequent landing of the heavy armor, artillery, and engineering equipment needed to give weight to the attack.

STATED BRIEFLY, then, the transport helicopter will exert a profound influence on amphibious tactics — from the standpoint of both the offense and defense — by its ability to eliminate the surface passage of the water line by assault echelons.

All of which seems to indicate that the amphibious attack, powerful and wellnigh irresistible when conducted

in accordance with Marine Corps-Navy doctrine, (which was the basis of all Allied World War II landing doctrine) now has the added flexibility of the conventional airborne operation. This added strength of amphibious operations is gained, essentially, by combining the advantages of the straight airborne assault with the unsurpassed range and strategic mobility of our national sea power.

By so utilizing the transport helicopter as an adjunct of sea power, it will be possible to make helicopter airborne landings at ranges otherwise unattainable by any type of troop carrier aircraft. This is because the carriers that serve as the helicopters' base will carry the helicopters to the objective area where the amphibious operation is to be conducted. After arrival in the area of operations, the helicopters, flying off the carrier-transport decks are within operation range of the tactical objectives. Thus, by basing the employment of the helicopter on capabilities of surface vessels the actual range of the normally short range "flying-windmill" becomes, in effect, the range of the fleet itself. This in itself is a combat capability of vast significance, for it demonstrates how, through exploitation of existing naval power, the large helicopter can become an air transport vehicle capable of operating at ranges far beyond those of conventional type troop carrier planes.

It is no military secret that the straight airborne operation is still incapable of conducting a sustained assault at ranges that even approach those of seaborne amphibious forces. While the seaborne landing forces can conduct full scale operations across thousands of miles of water, the airborne assault is up against a stubborn barrier of operational range that still is to punch through the 1,000 mile mark. And even within its operational range, the airborne assault by conventional type aircraft cannot match the amphibious assault when it comes to transporting and landing heavy artillery, ordnance, and engineering equipment, items indispensable to sustained combat effort against a well equipped landpower army.



As an air vehicle for transporting combat personnel, the large helicopter possesses some major advantages over the conventional troop carrier planes. First, the helicopter lands its troop cargo in compact and organized tactical units. This is a decided advantage over troop carrier planes that discharge parachute personnel at such speeds as to make the assembly and reorganization of personnel a tactical prerequisite before even entering combat after the jump. Even at minimum safe speeds troop carrier pilots are often unable to locate their assigned drop zones. In World War II airborne operations, the troops often landed far from the areas previously intended. In contrast, the transport helicopter, possessing the ability to travel at extremely slow speeds, and to even hover, permits a much more accurate terrain orientation as the pilot and troop commander can make a more deliberate and thorough examination of ground forms and landmarks. And, even in the event that troops should be landed in the wrong area, the helicopter can, combat conditions permitting, land and reembark its troops and proceed to carry them to the proper landing area.

Proper drop areas, so necessary to a large scale airborne assault, have far less significance to the transport helicopter. Even rough terrain is not a serious barrier, as the helicopter is fully capable of hovering a few feet above the ground while the troops disembark.

On the other side of the ledger, the transport helicopter has two limiting military characteristics: short range and low cruising speed. To a lesser extent, it is limited by weight carrying ability. These limitations, in spite of other advantages over the conventional troop carrier aircraft, have the effect of ruling the helicopter out as the major conveyance for the straight airborne operation.

Yet the significant thing is that when the carrier-based transport helicopter is used as a tool of sea power in the ship to shore movement of assault elements the advantages of the rotary wing aircraft are fully realized while at the same time the limitations of range and low speed are of but minor significance. The helicopter range is measured in terms of distance from the carrier base to the




landing zone, not from the nearest friendly land base from which conventional airborne formations would have to take off. The relatively short distances to be traversed by the helicopter in the ship to shore movement do not require a high speed craft. Likewise, the need for heavy weight-carrying ability is largely offset by the fact that very heavy equipment and the bulk of supplies will be landed in the conventional manner after the initial assault by helicopter-borne troops.

So, employment of the transport helicopter as a tool of sea power in the conduct of amphibious operations not only gives new tactical flexibility to the landing and assault, but it permits the employment of helicopters, with all their characteristic advantages, far beyond the range of the latest conventional troop carrier aircraft.

Those who point the accusing finger of obsolescence at amphibious operations seek to bolster their case with broadly worded contentions to the effect that large amphibious operations have been doomed to the past by atomic explosives. They point out that the threat of atomic bombs will never again permit the initially heavy concentration of shipping and boat traffic as was required in the transport area during at least the landing and early stages of the assault phase. Obviously, such masses of ships and amphibious craft would be an inviting and remunerative target for a defender possessing an atomic bomb.

While careful practical appraisal of the influence of the atomic bomb on amphibious operations will not substantiate the sweeping claim as to the total effectiveness of atomic explosives on World War II-type amphibious operations, the fact does remain that heavily concentrated shipping, required in the past during portions of the landing and assault, should be avoided in the conduct of operations against an atomic armed enemy. The problem then, is to be able to launch the amphibious attack, achieving necessary concentration of assault troops ashore without at the same time creating the concentration of shipping and amphibious craft that has characterized large amphibious operations in the past.





Although it will come as a surprise to those who believe all they hear about the absolute destructiveness of the atomic bomb, a large fleet in cruising disposition at sea is one of the least remunerative targets on which the A-bomb can be dropped. As naval spokesmen have previously explained, the maximum damage that one A-bomb can inflict on a fleet in proper cruising disposition is the loss of one ship.

Such low degree of vulnerability is achieved by wide dispersion of ships. So, if dispersion so drastically reduces danger from A-bomb attack on fleets at sea, why would not such a similar dispersion decrease the effectiveness of atomic attack against vessels participating in an amphibious attack? The answer to the question is simply that as long as sole reliance is placed upon conventional craft for the ship to shore movement, adequate dispersion of amphibious shipping would reduce the attacker's vulnerability to the point where the shipping would present an unremunerative target.

Yet, the answer lies not only in the attainment of mere dispersion. While effecting the necessary separation of shipping the assault must retain the ability to achieve concentration of force on the beach objective. In other words, the dispersion of shipping must be accompanied

individual ships. It must also be capable of carrying a reasonable number of troops and/or such materiel items as are essential to the assault. Such specifications amount to a pretty big order.

Only the transport helicopter fulfills these specifications. With a cruising speed roughly 10 times that of landing vehicles and craft, the transport helicopter thus will permit a dispersion of shipping 10 times greater than now permissible with conventional craft; and at the same time the amphibious attack will have the same capability for concentration of force in the beachhead that is so indispensable to the successful conduct of the amphibious assault.

• **IGOR SIKORSKY**, the eminent authority on helicopters, sees in the transport helicopter an answer to the problem of conducting the amphibious operations in the face of an enemy defender's possessing the atomic bomb. According to Sikorsky's concept, the transport area, instead of being in relatively close to shore as is now necessary with conventional landing craft, will be well out to sea from the beachhead area. Transports will be capable of launching the helicopter-borne assault while the ships are moving at normal speed in widely scattered disposi-

**A simultaneous attack from sea and air will provide a real headache for defense force commanders. Heretofore the defender could ascertain likely landing beaches and knew the attacker must cross the waterline at some time and place; now he can ill-afford to concentrate all troops on the coast**

by a method of conducting the ship to shore movement within about the same time factors as formerly applied. Then, if shipping, for example, was to be dispersed over an area 10 times greater than that now required and the ship to shore movement had to cover distances also 10 times greater than customary, it would require conventional landing craft 10 times as long to make the ship to shore run. And that would be utterly unacceptable in an amphibious operation, the basic feature of which has been the ability to strike the enemy beach defenses with a highly concentrated force. In land warfare the principle of concentration of force cannot be violated with impunity. Failure to adhere to the same principle in the amphibious assault invites disaster.

If reasonable invulnerability from atomic attack is to be achieved by amphibious shipping in the landing assault phase, then a ship to shore vehicle must be obtained that has sufficient speed to compensate for the increased distances over which assault elements must be transported from their ships to the objective.

The requirements for such a ship to shore vehicle are unique. The speed must be many times that attainable by amphibious vessels, and at the same time the conveyance must be able to take off from and return repeatedly to

tions. This Sikorsky points out, will avoid "the dangerous concentration of vessels and the need of their being stationary," as is now the case.

This well-nigh revolutionary development in amphibious warfare will not only give protection from atomic attack through dispersion of transport forces well out at sea — probably even out of the defender's view below the horizon — but it will be seen that by being able to maintain cruising speed during the launching of assault echelons the transport forces will realize added security from submarine attack. This latter advantage in itself is of major importance, particularly in view of the fact that the foremost threat to U. S. naval supremacy may, according to present reports, be effected by submarines.

Thus the transport helicopter opens the way to even more effective and overwhelming amphibious attack capabilities than were realized during the last war. And all this in spite of the dire predictions from some quarters (non-naval) that *the bomb* and the high speed schnorkel submarine spelled the end of major amphibious operations.

Of course, it should be pointed out that the transport helicopter will not be the sole medium for effecting the ship to shore movement of supplies and personnel. Rath-

er, its primary use will be in the transportation of the assault personnel with their high priority supplies and equipment needed to initiate and sustain action.

• AFTER LANDING the assault echelons the ship to shore movement of reserves, supplies, and heavy equipment will utilize both the helicopters and conventional landing craft. Priority items, within weight limitations, will move by helicopters, and the landing craft will convey the heavier equipment and bulk supplies. As the attack develops ashore, transports will probably move progressively closer to the beach, reducing the running time for landing craft, until in the later stages almost exclusive reliance will be placed on surface craft for the landing of the almost endless amounts of supplies and equipment required by large amphibious operations. Helicopters, however, will not be idle, for they are admirably fitted for use in the evacuation of wounded.


This almost complete reliance on surface craft for moving the bulk of equipment and supplies serves to illustrate once again how the amphibious operation is inseparably tied to naval shipping. In the final analysis, despite the added flexibility and other advantages of the helicopter, the operation as a whole is based upon shipping, for only surface vessels have the capacity and range necessary for the conduct of a major overseas attack. And this will continue to be a fundamental characteristic of amphibious operations as long as it is more efficient to slide a cargo carrier over the surface of the water

than it is to project the same amount of cargo with its carriers through the air.

The ship to shore movement by transport helicopter is no independent feature of the amphibious operation, no separate airborne landing. Rather it is an inextricable portion of the over-all amphibious operation. As such the air vehicle as used in this instance becomes an adjunct of sea power, in principle closely following the example of carrier-based aircraft. Thus, the carrier-based helicopter logically fits into its role as a new tool of sea power. Even the exploitation of the transport helicopter does not alter the predominantly naval character of amphibious operations.

• AND SO THE AMPHIBIOUS operation, while realizing added effectiveness from a specialized type of aircraft—the helicopter—remains fundamentally a sea-borne affair. Such enhancement of our national sea power through exploitation of specialized aviation is nothing new in the development of U. S. naval power. Conception and adoption of the transport helicopter as an added agency of our naval power is simply a continuation of the same kind of thinking that long ago recognized that naval power consisted of more than ships. It was this uniquely American line of thought, stemming largely from the efficient integration of Marine landing forces into fleet organization during the Spanish-American War, that marked the departure of U. S. naval thought from that of European powers. In turn, this realization of the efficacy of the

Various combinations of seats and cargo space give the S-55 many services not previously within the scope of helicopters.





The Sikorsky H-19 is a 12-place craft that has a combat range of 280 miles and a range of 1000 miles with auxiliary fuel.

balanced force concept paid great dividends in terms of national security.

Carrier aviation and the amphibious knowledge that proved the key to victory in World War II stemmed directly from the progressive brand of naval thought that was willing to adopt any new tools that would mean more effective application of our national sea power. The concept of the transport helicopter as the ship to shore assault vehicle is another example of the manner in which new concepts can be adopted when naval thought is based on the foundation of a sound understanding of sea power. Indeed, it is worth noting that only U. S. naval thought, freed from narrow Continental "understanding" of sea power and unfettered by a Continental-type supreme staff system, has produced the revolutionary new concepts of the carrier, modern amphibious war, and now the transport helicopter, which in turn will give greater versatility and value to the carrier—the troop transport of tomorrow—and new power to amphibious operations.

In summation, then, it can be said that the Marine-conceived transport helicopter will impart new flexibility to the amphibious attack, provide a means of conducting amphibious operations in the atomic age and combine the effectiveness of the airborne assault with the unsurpassed range and strategic mobility of sea power. As such, the development of the transport helicopter as a ship to shore vehicle ultimately may well be as much of an improve-

ment over World War II amphibious method as the World War II method was over that of Gallipoli. This improvement in our nation's war making ability is the direct outgrowth of the maintenance of a specialized amphibious force (the Marine Corps) as an agency of U. S. naval power.

When evaluated in terms of its meaning to amphibious warfare and our nation's ability to project U. S. armed forces against an enemy homeland, the concept of the transport helicopter as a ship to shore vehicle emerges as the most significant and imaginative contribution to the conduct of war evolved by our armed services since World War II.

The development of modern amphibious warfare and now the further perfection of that doctrine by development of the transport helicopter, is indisputable evidence of the wisdom of our nation's maintenance of Marine amphibious specialists whose intimate association and knowledge of the nature of our seapower has produced the amphibious know-how that in turn makes it possible for our nation to project not only its sea power, but also our land and air power across the vast ocean areas.

The manner in which Marine-Naval thought has developed the transport helicopter as a new tool of U. S. sea power is but another example of the deep meaning of Winston Churchill's observation: "Sea power when properly understood is a wonderful thing." US MC



# Air Power And The German War Economy

By James A. Huston, PhD

A PAIR OF HISTORICAL MYTHS GROWING OUT OF World War II continues to prevail almost without challenge. Nourished by historians and observers who wrote while hostilities continued — and thus did not have access to the material which became available only after defeat of the Axis, this dual misinterpretation yet persists. These myths spring from a popular overestimate of the German economic mobilization in the early years of the war, on the one hand, and then an exaggerated notion of the efficacy of Allied air power in destroying that economy, on the other.

There is no intention here of attempting a judicious application of hindsight merely to point criticism toward writers and historians who dared write of the war contemporaneously. If everyone should wait until all the information is in, there never would be any history written. The disadvantage of such contemporary writing

on war, however, should be recognized, and when interpretations, on the basis of new evidence, no longer seem tenable, they should be questioned.

The impression which, for example, F. Lee Benns gives in his *Europe Since 1914* (6th Ed., New York: F. S. Crofts and Company, 1946) has become a generally accepted one —

Meanwhile, by the spring of 1943, it was estimated that the Allied bombers had destroyed or seriously damaged some 2,000 German factories and had caused a very appreciable decrease in the coal and steel production of the Ruhr. By the end of that year nine of Germany's larger cities had been converted into economic liabilities, and German fighter-plane production had been reduced by nearly 40 per cent. The destruction of power plants, railway junctions, canals, synthetic-rubber plants, and factories producing munitions, airplane engines, and aircraft undoubtedly constituted a softening up of Germany by the cumulative attrition of her war potential . . . . . (p. 601)

A similar interpretation is to be found from the British



Rail yard at Marburg, Germany, was plastered time after time by U. S. light and medium bombers.

historian, R. C. K. Ensor in *A Miniature History of the War* (3rd edition, London: Oxford University Press, 1945)—

The application of these [bombing] methods in 1942 to one great German city after another was, as far as Germany was concerned, a turning point in the struggle . . . it dealt crushing blows to her war industries. . . . . (—p. 53)

This destruction of the Ruhr [1943] was a landmark for German war industry; it never recovered from it . . . (—p. 67)

This impression became more authoritative with Gen Carl Spaatz's "Strategic Air Power" in *Foreign Affairs* for April 1946, and with his subsequent statements (see, for example *Newsweek* for Oct 18, 1948). The former Air Force Chief quoted the statement of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey that "Allied air power was decisive in the war in western Europe." In doing so, he tended to contribute to the myth that the German war economy was destroyed by air attack. Allied air power probably was decisive, but, taken alone, that statement may be misleading. There has been little reference to the lengthy findings of that Bombing Survey which might have corrected that popular misconception.

IT HAS become general to accept without serious question the explanation that Allied bombs destroyed the German aircraft industry. Much importance has been attached to the so-called "big week" — the third week in February 1944. Such is the view which Edgar McInnis suggests in *The War: Fifth Year* (London, etc.: Oxford University Press, 1945)—

In the third week in February the opportunity arrived. A heavy night attack on Leipzig on February 19 inaugurated a week whose outcome was of fatal consequence to the *Luftwaffe* and of pivotal importance for Allied operations in the west. The day and night bombers, striking at 15 major aircraft centres, co-ordinated their efforts in a concerted attempt to demolish German fighter production . . .

The result was a clear-cut Allied victory which was certain to rank among the decisive episodes of the war. The German air force had been struck a body blow which completely shattered its hopes, not merely of increasing, but even of maintaining its defensive strength. In a single week its chief centres of production had been shattered by 18,000 tons of bombs. The blows had fallen on plants producing 60 per cent of Germany's single-engine and 80 per cent of her twin-engine fighter planes. Production of these types had been reduced to the level of the autumn of 1942, wiping out all the gains of the past 18 months in production capacity.

From February on, German fighters were being destroyed faster than they could be replaced, while German production was pushed steadily downward. (—pp. 139-142)

McInnes repeats this picture in an article in the *Encyclopedia Americana*, 1946 edition, XXVIII, 845 —

A week of good flying weather in February gave the Allies an opportunity for which they had been waiting. A night raid on airplane factories in the Leipzig area on February 19 was followed by substantial day and night raids over a wide area . . . and the outcome was a fatal blow to German air strength. Production of fighter planes was set back to the level of the autumn of 1942, and the Allies were able to hold it down by selective raids in the subsequent months while they turned their attention to German oil production and to tactical objectives.

A similar impression is to be found in Harvey Wish, *Contemporary America* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945) — "American bombers of the Eighth Air

**CONCERNING THE AUTHOR**—At present Dr Huston is in his fourth year at Purdue University, where he is an assistant professor in the Department of History, Economics, and Government. Currently, he is teaching courses in international relations and recent American history. Dr Huston received his AB with honors at Indiana University in 1939 and later received his AM from the same school. From 1940 to 1942 he was a Penfield Fellow in International Relations at New York University. After the war he returned to NYU and got his PhD in 1947.

During the war, Dr Huston served with the 134th Infantry, 35th Division, both in training and throughout his regiment's participation in combat from Normandy to the Elbe. He has also served as a consultant to the Department of the Army's Historical Division.

Force dealt Germany's aircraft industry a severe blow and forced the Luftwaffe to go on the defensive." (—p. 594).

But such does not now seem to have been the case. To have reduced production of German fighter planes to the level of 1942, it would have been necessary for that production to have been held to a monthly figure of about 509 planes (the average for the last four months of 1942). On the contrary, fighter production in February 1944 amounted to a total of 1,104. True, this represented a drop of 404 from the January level, but in March — following the "big week" — the figure went to a new high of 1,638. And production climbed steadily until September when it reached 3,375 for the month — a figure double that of Allied intelligence estimates at the time. Even in December, fighter production still was twice what it had been in February. Indeed, the February attacks seem even to have encouraged German production rather than to have succeeded in its destruction. That is to say, it now became imperative to make the best possible utilization of capacity and to introduce more efficient methods.<sup>1</sup>

While German aircraft acceptances for 1940 and for 1941 were between 10- and 12,000 for each year, in 1942 production went up to 16,000. In the face of intensified bombing attacks in 1943, German aircraft production exceeded 26,000. Even with the bomber offensive stepped up to deliver no less than 1,200,000 tons of explosives and incendiaries, German aircraft production in 1944 almost reached 40,000!<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy* (1945), pp. 153, 156, 159, 277.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 277.

Likewise there remains the assumption that air attacks against submarine yards resulted in an important reduction in U-boat production. Thus Dwight L. Dumond notes in *America in Our Time* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1947)—

The list of factories, shipyards, railway centers, and power plants destroyed grew more impressive each day . . . the continuous attacks upon submarine building centers and ports, such as Cologne, Wilhelmshaven, St. Nazaire, and Brest, contributed powerfully toward dissipating the U-boat menace. (—pp. 633f.)

Again, however, submarine building reached its peak in 1944. Most important of the underwater craft in terms of production were the Type 7 and Type 9 boats. Only three of these were prevented from scheduled completion by air attack prior to 1945. Production of all types (excepting 99 midget) craft in 1944 amounted to 286, with a tonnage of 274,100. This is to be compared with a tonnage of 211,400 in 1943, 193,000 in 1942, and 147,800 in 1941.<sup>3</sup>

• BASIC to any war economy in this age, of course, is steel. Some would seek to find the key to the German defeat in the air attacks against the steel industry. No target area stands out more prominently than the Ruhr. Walter Phelps Hall, in *Iron Out of Calvary* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1946), concludes that—

The plane did not knock out Germany, but it did severely weaken military power there. The RAF, numerically stronger in 1943 than the American air arm in Europe, concentrated on the Ruhr, pounding congested areas in that industrial valley over and over again, blowing up houses, railroads and dams, flooding towns, pulverizing factories, killing unknown numbers of persons, reducing German steel production perhaps 30 per cent. (—p. 279)

In spite of repeated bombings of the Ruhr valley, nevertheless, when infantrymen marched through that great industrial area in March and April 1945 they found factory chimneys still smoking. As far as total steel production in Germany was concerned, the 1943 bombing hardly was noticeable. In metric tons, this amounted to 28,744,000 tons in 1942 and 30,603,000 tons in 1943. Moreover, production during the first half of 1944 was greater than that for the preceding six months. There was a significant reduction in the last half of 1944. The Strategic Bombing Survey, none the less, found that "The production declines in the steel industry appear to have had an unimportant effect upon the output of finished military items."<sup>4</sup>

• AN EXAMINATION of production figures in the armaments industries makes this apparent. Far from being brought to her knees by the deluge of more than 2,000,000 tons of bombs, Germany was able to produce in 1944 not only more aircraft and more submarines,

<sup>3</sup>The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *Over-all Report (European War)* (1945), pp. 69-70.

<sup>4</sup>U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy*, p. 252; *Over-all Report (European War)*, p. 80.



**Close-up of Concordia Vega oil refinery at Ploesti, Rumania, after 15th AF bombing, September '44.**

but more tanks, more guns, and more ammunition than ever before! German panzer production reached its peak in the last quarter of 1944. Total production for those three months amounted to 5,236 tanks, assault guns, and self-propelled guns; and even during the first quarter of 1945 — the period which saw the Allied occupation of the Rhineland and the crossing of the Rhine — the Germans were able to turn out 3,932 of the armored vehicles. Best production records for preceding years were 1,880 in the fourth quarter of 1942 and 3,781 in the fourth quarter of 1943.<sup>5</sup>

Assigning the average monthly production of weapons and ammunition for January and February 1942 index numbers of 100, the Bombing Survey found an almost continuous increase in output of weapons from that time until December 1944 when weapons production reached a maximum index of 408. Similarly, 1944 was the big year for ammunition production; its index was above 300 for every month except January and December.<sup>6</sup> More specifically, the *increase* in weapons production between January 1943 and December 1944 followed this kind of a pattern: army guns, 181 per cent; naval guns and torpedoes, 10 per cent; antiaircraft artillery, 124 per cent; aircraft guns, 233 per cent. There was a nine per cent decrease in production of bombs and aircraft ammunition in the period between January 1943 and September 1944. Other categories of ammunition, however, showed *increases* in this manner: army ammunition, 57 per cent;

antiaircraft, 73 per cent; navy, 53 per cent.<sup>7</sup>

It seems that the conclusion that air attacks against the anti-friction bearing industry resulted in serious bottlenecks in German industry is yet widely held. It is a conclusion which Robert Ergang offers in *Europe in Our Time* (New York etc.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1948):

"Although the Allies often suffered heavy losses, they did succeed in greatly curtailing the production of war materials. The raid on Schweinfurt, for instance, which had cost 593 men and 60 planes, had cut German production of ball bearings in half. As a result of such bombings bottlenecks developed in many industries which reduced the output of planes, tanks, and submarines.

Once more, however, the industry was able to recover, and the Germans could boast: "No equipment was ever delayed because bearings were lacking."<sup>8</sup>

Even the air attacks upon the railroad system — though they had, by the end of 1944, imposed serious delays on military operations — "had not seriously reduced the ability of the Army to originate tactical moves in volume."<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, "When the war ended, German rubber plants had not been damaged sufficiently to be a major factor in the defeat."<sup>10</sup>

Open to more serious question, perhaps, are statements such as some of those of Gladwin Hill in *The New York Times Book Review* (Nov 23, 1947). In reviewing *Bomber Offensive*, by Marshal of the RAF Sir Arthur Harris (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947),

<sup>5</sup>*The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy*, pp. 181-3.


<sup>6</sup>*Over-all Report*, pp. 28-29.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 64.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 49.

<sup>5</sup>Strategic Bombing Survey, *Over-all Report*, p. 66.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 81-82.



Hill permits himself such possibly misleading criticisms as this:

By nimble evasive action he avoids more than a passing reference to the months and months of daily American attacks on the Germans' V-1 bases in France which saved England untold destruction.

Actually, the Strategic Bombing Survey did find that the bombing attacks delayed the beginning of the launching program of V-1s, but it also arrived at this conclusion—

In the case of the V-2, bombing of launching sites did not delay firing, since technical difficulties with the weapon were not overcome until September, at which time launchings began.

There is no evidence that bombing reduced the volume of fire of V-1s after launching had started except during a 2-week period following the attack on the supply depot at Nucovert. (—Overall Report (European War), pp. 88-9)

The reviewer of *Bomber Offensive* continues with another statement from which one may draw a wrong inference—

He disputes the United States Strategic Bombing Survey's appraisal of our bombing of the Germans' secret-weapon base at Peenemunde, and discounts the value of our extensive damage to the Ploesti oil wells — source of one-third of Germany's supply.

Here is the United States Strategic Bombing Survey's appraisal of the bombing of the secret-weapon base at Peenemunde—

Allied bombing countermeasures began in August 1943 with an RAF raid on the experimental station at Peenemunde where research and development work on V-weapons and other similar projects were being conducted. The experimental work was unaffected. Three attacks by the Eighth Air Force a year later severely damaged the station, but by this time the development of V-1 had been completed. These attacks may have delayed somewhat the solution of the technical difficulties with V-2 in the summer of 1944, although this is uncertain. (—Over-all Report, p. 88.)

This is the Bombing Survey's appraisal of the air attacks against the Ploesti oil region—

The Rumanian oil refineries at Ploesti were attacked in a number of daring and costly raids by Allied planes operating from north Africa and Italian bases. A spectacular low-level attack made on August 1, 1943, had only a temporary effect. Deliveries of Rumanian oil to Germany actually increased until April 1944, when the attacks were renewed. The increased imports from this source assisted the Germans to build up their stocks just prior to the Normandy invasion on June 6 to the highest level since May 1941. (—Over-all Report, p. 41.)

Finally, in connection with the myth of the destructiveness of the bombing attacks against the German economy, it should be noted that "bomb damage to the civilian economy was not a proximate cause of the military collapse of Germany." The Strategic Bombing Survey found "no evidence that shortages of civilian goods reached a point where the German authorities were forced to transfer resources from war production in order to prevent disintegration of the home front."<sup>11</sup>

How then, did Germany lose the war? Was the whole strategic bombing program in vain? The answer, of course, is to be found in the cumulative effect of a number of factors, and not in any single explanation like

<sup>11</sup>*The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy*, p. 137.

"air power." Certainly the strategic bombing attacks had effect. It must be remembered that, in the absence of those attacks, German production undoubtedly would have been considerably higher than it was in most categories. There was a great deal of lost production — but not necessarily an actual decrease from previous output. Where the bombing attacks actually had greatest effectiveness seems to have been against oil — after May 1944 (the effectiveness now included the Ploesti targets, where exports to Germany declined sharply from May till July; the Russians occupied the Romanian fields in August).<sup>12</sup> Impotence of the Luftwaffe was attributable to two major factors: the shortage of aviation gasoline — and the concomitant shortage of trained pilots — and its tactical defeats at the hands of Allied aircraft.<sup>13</sup> Not to be overlooked in the final disintegration of Germany is the defeat of her ground forces in the field and the occupation of her territory. Occupation of the Ruhr was more effective in arresting production than was bombing.

• BUT THE CHIEF explanation of the seeming paradox of greater war production in the face of greater bombing attacks is to be found in the second of twin myths to which reference was made in the beginning. This popular misconception springs from authoritative contemporary statements which did not contain some truth. For example there was Winston Churchill's speech at Edinburgh on October 12, 1942—

When peaceful people like the British and Americans, who are very careless in peacetime about their defense; carefree, unsuspecting nations and people who have never known defeat; improvident nations, I will say reckless nations, who despised military art and thought war so wicked it never could happen again — when nations like this are set upon by highly organized and heavily armed conspirators who have been planning in secret over years on end, exalting war as the highest form of human effort, glorifying slaughter and aggression and prepared and trained to the last point to which science and discipline can carry them, it is natural that the peaceful and improvident should suffer terribly. (—quoted in Albert T. Lauterbach, *Economics in Uniform*, Princeton University Press, 1943, p. ix.)

It is this thinking, based upon unreliable information, which leads Lauterbach to continue: "For at least four years the German economy was kept in a state of permanent though steadily increasing preparedness" (p. 81). The misconception finds more direct statement by Edgar McInnis in *The War: First Year* (London, etc.: Oxford University Press, 1945)—

The very fact that consumer goods had already been so drastically reduced in favor of armaments left little margin for further intensification of productive efforts for war purposes . . . Germany seemed almost at the peak of her economic effort. [1939] (—p. 47)

Such, of course, was a generally-held belief. It is advanced again by E. M. Earle's "The Nazi Concept of War" in *Makers of Modern Strategy*—

The Four Year Plans . . . brought about the complete militarization

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 78-9.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 81.



Hangars were wrecked, planes destroyed, pilots killed, yet Germany increased aircraft production in 1944.

zation of German economy. As a result, the German army entered the war in 1939 better equipped, and with larger reserves of material, than any other modern army (quoted in Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Foundations of National Power*. Princeton University Press, 1945, p. 359).

Or again by Benns—

Although the Germans had for years been working at a full wartime pace in the production of military supplies . . . Great Britain [in January 1940] had much slack to take up. (—*Europe since 1914*, pp. 509-10).

And Dumond—

[The Nazis] regimented the national economy and turned the energies of the whole people to rearmament.

In 1939, therefore, it was unarmed democracies against well armed dictators. (—*America in Our Time*, pp. 577, 578, 579).


And Oscar Theodore Barck, Jr., and Nelson Manfred Blake, *Since 1900* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947)—

While they [Germany and Japan] had been preparing for many years, their foes were largely unprepared. (—p. 699).

Or Robert Ergang—

Thereafter rearmament proceeded at an ever-increasing pace, so that Germany was before long living on what amounted to a war-time footing . . . The production of airplanes was put on an assembly-line basis like that of motor cars. (*Europe in Our Time*, pp. 338-9).

Now the surprising thing about the German war economy was the low output of armaments during the first three years of the war. It was an output which was surprisingly low whether viewed in comparison with what Germany was *believed* to be doing, or in comparison with her later achievement, or in comparison with the level of production of Great Britain. As a matter of fact British



Despite damage to transportation system from bombing, Hitler could originate tactical moves in volume in 1944.

production (i.e., in the United Kingdom) of aircraft, armored vehicles, trucks, and wheeled vehicles of all types exceeded the German in 1940, 1941, and 1942.<sup>14</sup>

German war production, apparently based upon a Hitlerian strategy of a series of separate, quick victories over less prepared states, was not limited by its potential at this point, but simply by the demand upon it. Early victories seemed to demonstrate the soundness of this concept, and there appeared to be no necessity for stepping up the war production effort. After the fall of France, Britain offered no serious direct threat and the United States was not taken seriously. Even the launching of the great offensive against Russia had little immediate effect upon the economic mobilization, for it was assumed that that country too should be subjugated within three to four months.

Here, of course, appeared a major miscalculation. Yes, the first three months of the Russian campaign went pretty much "according to plan." Indeed, at the end of September Hitler, thinking the war won, ordered a large-scale reduction in armaments production. The order was only partially carried out, but it did result in an important reduction in stocks. But December found the German Army battling at the gates of Moscow. An army whose campaign was supposed to have been won weeks earlier—in the warm days of autumn—now faced the bitter Russian winter ill-prepared for its task. It was a decisive battle of the war.

<sup>14</sup>Over-all Report (European War) p. 31.

December 1941 brought the Germans into a situation which they had hoped to avoid — the prospect of a long war. The defeat before Moscow and the entry of the United States into the war dimmed the hopes for an early victory. Now leaders began to call for an all-out effort in production.

Nevertheless, in comparison with her Allied antagonists, Germany still had no "total mobilization" or long-term planning. There were only moderate restrictions on consumers' goods, little effort at more effective employment of manpower.<sup>15</sup>

But German losses in Russia were reaching unprecedented heights. The Polish, French, Yugoslav, and Greek campaigns had cost the invaders 650 tanks and self-propelled guns. Now they encountered something of a surprise in the Russian T-34 tank — and losses in January 1942 alone amounted to 700 panzers. And in February the Germans lost 2,200 tanks and SP guns.<sup>16</sup>

With the appointment of Albert Speer as minister of weapons and ammunition (later minister of armament and war production) in February 1942 a new era — the "Speer period" began in German war production. His program of rationalization on a mass production basis resulted, during a two and one-half year period, in a three-fold increase in the production of weapons, ammunition and aircraft, and, with top priority after the Stalingrad disaster, tank production increased seven fold. Yes, there was much slack to be taken up in German war industry.

The war economy only began to reach its limits in March 1944. Production capacity never had been really short, machinery capacity had never been fully utilized, manpower had not been fully mobilized. With few exceptions the armament industry worked only single shifts throughout the war.<sup>17</sup>

Walter Phelps Hall writes: "Only Germany was aware and fit for war. 'Not butter — guns,' had been her slogan for two years." (*Iron Out of Calvary*, p. 79.) But now we find that while war production had increased during the 1930's, this had not meant any reduction in the total output of civilian goods. On the contrary, the level of consumption in 1939 was far above what it had been in 1932, and seems to have been greater than that of 1928-29. There was only moderate curtailment in civilian production and consumption in the whole period before Stalingrad. The economy met the limited demands placed upon it during the early years of the war largely without controls. It was a situation which a leading German statistician called a "peacelike war economy." It appears not to have been a case, then, as Hall suggests, of a failure of manpower and production (p. 281); it

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 66.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., pp. 31-34; *The Effects of Strategic Bombing on The German War Economy*, pp. 24-26.

is unlikely that there was any lowering of the war potential, as he implies, through a lowered output on the part of the workers in 1943 (p. 284).<sup>18</sup>

Lauterbach alludes to an increasing employment of women in industry, and to compulsory labor measures. (*Economics in Uniform*, p. 92.) There were recommendations that women be drafted into industry, and hours be lengthened, but such measures were not introduced. About 40 per cent of German women were employed in industry in 1939, and that number did not change appreciably. At the same time, however, the employment of British women in industry rose from a similar figure of 40 per cent to 56 per cent.<sup>19</sup> Again the Strategic Bombing Survey concludes: "All available evidence indicates that at no time did a shortage of workers exert an important deterring effect on munitions output." (*The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy*, p. 23.)

The United States Department of Commerce, it appears, may not have shared in the general overrating of the extent of German economic mobilization, but if not, it was on the basis of assumptions which scarcely could have been more completely wrong:

The outstanding features of German national economy at the outbreak of war in September 1939 were shortage of labor, inadequacy of transportation facilities, scarcity of essential raw materials, even of those locally produced, such as coal, steel, and timber, full utilization of available industrial commandering of a disproportionately large share of the national income for the financing of rearmament and public construction. (—U. S. Dept. of Commerce, "Report on Germany's War Economy," May 1940, quoted by Lauterbach, p. 89.)

As already has been pointed out, there was no serious shortage of labor; the German transportation system actually was one of the most adequate and best-maintained in the world — maintenance standards of railways and waterways were well above those in the United States; the Germans were able to avoid serious shortages in raw materials, except for oil, until late in 1944; industrial capacity was far from being fully utilized;<sup>20</sup> the share of the gross national product going into armaments production in 1939 was seven per cent — to be compared with 2.6 per cent in the United States (to become 45 per cent in 1944) and 17 per cent in Japan.

THE TWIN MYTHS which yet persist in currently-used textbooks and reference books, then, are the overrating of the extent of the German economic mobilization during the early years of the war, on the one hand, and the overrating of the effectiveness of air power in destroying it, on the other. It is not the purpose here to inquire into the valid question of what might the Air Forces have done had they been granted sufficient aircraft, bombs, and time. But what actually was done can not be inter-

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 130f.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 34ff.; *Over-all Report (European War)*, pp. 34-36.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 59, 36.

preted as a destruction of the German war economy from the air. Any speculation as to what the Air Forces *might* have done should be undertaken in connection with consideration of another statement of General Spaatz in the article referred to above: "German manufacture of jet-fighters and bombers could have reached dangerous proportions in another six months." (*Foreign Affairs*, April 1946, p. 396.) On the other hand, one should recognize the increasing effectiveness of the air attacks as well as the cumulative effect of the months of bombing on the complex of factors involved. The air attacks reached their peak in the third quarter of 1944 when 403,808 tons of bombs were dropped (compared to 66,159 tons in the third quarter of 1943)<sup>21</sup> — the same period in which German war production began to decline.

The statement from the Strategic Bombing Survey upon which Gen Spaatz seizes — "Allied air power was decisive in the war in western Europe" — doubtless is true. But it is true in the sense that any link in a chain is indispensable. It is arrived at through the same kind of thinking that, because the war (either World War) could not have been won without American assistance, America won the war.

BY THE WAY of postscript it ought to be noted that some of the same kind of thinking is being applied to explain the defeat of Japan. In his discussion of strategic air power in *Foreign Affairs*, Gen Spaatz acknowledges the importance of the land and sea forces in the Pacific War, but he leaves no doubt of the leading role of air power in fashioning the victory:

Japan was reduced by air power, operating from bases captured by the coordination of land, sea, and air forces. (—p. 396).

The Strategic Bombing Survey found that reduction of Japanese war production was chiefly attributable to the destruction of Japan's shipping, and that the principal instrument in the destruction of the Japanese merchant fleet was the submarine. Of the 8,900,000 tons sunk or put out of action, submarines accounted for 54.7 per cent; indeed, until the last few months of the war the underwater craft were responsible for 60 per cent of the sinkings.


But what about the atomic bombs? Was it not air power that delivered those decisive mechanisms to Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

Here is the Strategic Bombing Survey's conclusion:

*It is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.*<sup>22</sup> USMC

<sup>21</sup>*The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy*, pp. 3, 5.

<sup>22</sup>U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the Japanese War Economy* (1946).



# Reporters For Newsmen

By 1st Lt Cecil P. Lewis, USMCR

WHEN I WAS A FEW YEARS YOUNGER THERE WAS A war on, and I was in boot camp, there was a lad in my platoon who was caught by our drill instructor in the process of writing poetry.

Naturally, the DI was highly indignant and announced to one and all that he "could and would make a fighting man out of even a poet, come hell or high tide." What he neglected to point out, however, is the fact that it is not always possible to make a poet out of a fighter. Neither is it easy to make a competent public information man out of a man who is not interested in the job or who has no aptitude for it.

The Marine Corps' public information section was tops during the war . . . there was no better . . . editors, working newspapermen and the general public agree that this is true. There is every reason that the wartime section should have been tops, however, since it was made up largely of newspaper men who had pounded a beat before the world was aware of Hitler and Japan was still being thought of as a country where people grew flowers and enjoyed it. In the sections' ranks were working free lance talent that had made names for themselves in every field from children's books and comic strips to big time reporting with the White House as a beat.

Those men are gone now. With their old jobs and more money on "the outside" they couldn't see the advantage of continuing in the service as sergeants, junior officers and the ranks designated for combat correspondents and other public information personnel. They were experts who felt that they stood better chances of receiving experts' pay in civilian life.

Back on a peacetime basis, the Marine Corps has undoubtedly felt the loss of these men. It shows in the daily newspapers where releases from the various posts and stations are printed. It shows in the magazines of national circulation which rarely carry articles or stories with a Marine Corps background, and it shows in the number of inches which clipping bureaus forward to Marine Corps activities showing the Corps in print.

In recruiting offices, some posts and the smaller activities all over the country, men who have never

handled public information work have suddenly been assigned a typewriter, handed a camera and told they are IT. Many of these men, regardless of the number of chevrons they wear, are not educated in the ways of the press . . . they are fighting men who went through a war with a weapon in hand to earn the stripes they now sport. They may have all the command presence in the world and be assets to the Marine Corps so far as meeting the public is concerned, or they may properly reflect the glories and traditions as they strut down the street in their best set of blues. This doesn't teach them the difference between a period and a comma, however. Neither does it teach them the *rudimentary* rule in news writing that the lead sentence in a story is supposed to capture and hold the reader's attention, and not read like something out of an instructional manual for the machine gun, water-cooled, Model 1918.

One typical example of the type of public information releases that have been coming out in recent months is found in one turned out for local newspapers on the Marine Corps birthday, November 10, by the public information personnel of a West Coast station. It was nothing more and nothing less than a chapter from the Marine Corps Manual copied verbatim and tracing the corps' history from Tun Tavern to the present. Not one line was included as to what steps were being taken on the base to celebrate the occasion. There was no local picture whatsoever.

SOME EDITORS PUBLISHED IT, of course, but it was only because they were short on other copy. Odds are offered here and now that if a survey is made of the papers to which the piece was distributed, far more of them threw it into the well-known File 13 than sent it to the back shop to be set up in type.

For the same occasion, another public information office lifted a year-old write-up from an inter-service magazine which had started the traditional tale with the initiation of the first boot in the Philadelphia groggery without bothering to either rewrite it or credit the original source. The office had sent it out to several dozen newspapers within its area.

Certainly an occasion which the Marine Corps as a whole regards with such reverence as is offered November 10th each year deserves better treatment than that!

The purpose of this article is not to point out the mistakes and faults of the corps' public information section, however, but to offer some constructive ideas as to how its present standing may be improved. For many years, the Marine Corps has been tops in history and tradition, and the majority of men and officers have felt that the organization needed no press agents . . . they felt that its record spoke for itself. And it has.

This, though, is a new era. Other service organizations have gone into public information with a vengeance and have high ranking officers handling their public relations jobs. They are encouraging experienced men to come into their ranks and to handle their press, radio, and motion picture activities. These men, incidentally, have enough rank that they need not bow too low before the desires of higher brass who may have a personal dislike for publicity and public relations men.

Since the Marine Corps is a small, component unit, it is not expected that colonels or brigadier generals should be sent out to meet newsmen, but on the other hand, neither should green second lieutenants who are only a few months out of Basic School and even more recently out of the Navy or Armed Forces journalism and public information schools. Instead, a seasoned newsman who knows what reporters want and what constitutes the news that people want to read in their daily newspapers is the prime requisite in such a situation as this.

What to do? . . . that is the question. And there is a logical answer. The answer is untried, it is true, and is something new for any military organization, but if it

would improve the public information facilities, it might at least be worthy of some consideration and possible experimentation.

Each year, the Marine Corps takes a certain number of NROTC graduates, graduates of the PLC classes, and other recommended collegians into its ranks. They come as newly commissioned second lieutenants with their diplomas yet in hand. Most of them end up in the line organizations or carrying out similar duties.

Out of this annual influx, however, there is certain to be a number of students who have majored in journalism while in college. They have the education, but not the experience. Nearly any city editor in the country hates to see spring come when his reporting ranks will suddenly be filled with new graduates who think they are qualified reporters. Experience is a necessary factor and something that only comes with time.

With new diplomas and journalism certificates in their bags, are these new lieutenants qualified to become public information officers? Even after the public information indoctrination course, are they qualified to tell the world what the Marine Corps is doing and why?

The average working newsmen will shake his head. They lack the experience of the finished reporter that marks him as a judge of news rather than a man who





**It is much easier to make a fighter out of a poet than it is to make a poet out of a fighter.**

sits down and writes words which the city editor may throw back in his lap as being unworthy of print.

Would it not be possible for the Marine Corps to commission these prospective gentlemen of the press as *Reserve* officers bearing a specialist's designation or even limited duty specification number as public information officers? They could then be instructed to get a year's experience on a daily newspaper, in radio or whatever their chosen field of journalistic endeavor may be. At the end of a year of experience in the field, they could be called to active duty as public information officers and if found capable, later given regular commissions in the Marine Corps. They would be seasoned in the ways of the city room, they would know the difference between news and mere incident and would be better able to serve the Marine Corps. They would also command the respect of the men under their command in the public information sections throughout the country as there would be less opportunity for others to say, "another green lieutenant who doesn't know the score . . . what's he know about PI work?"

Under the Marine Corps' present program, officers are not expected to spend too long a time in one capacity. Under the proposed plan, there would be no objection to the PI officers having secondary designations which would allow them to spend *some* time during their service careers in other organizations, leading a rifle platoon, doing administration work or whatever. But they would be principally public relations specialists whose chief job it is to inform the public of the current doings within the corps.

Regardless of what duties they may eventually be assigned to, they would be slated to return to public information work so that in a 30-year military career, they would spend the greater part of their time doing the job for which they have spent four years of college

and one in civilian life training before coming on active duty.

There will be some who will say, "If we let him have a year on a civilian paper before coming into the service, he will be a year older . . . That is a year that we will lose."

That is true. But on the other hand, young officers entering the Marine Corps now are a great deal younger than several years back. They start to college at 17 or so, and are often earning second lieutenant's pay by the time they are of age. During the war years, the age level was higher than at present. Losing that year to the city room of a daily newspaper won't harm his career too much, and the experience which the individual officer would bring into the Marine Corps with him would be several times more valuable.

Lest the average reader get the idea that the author feels that all present public information personnel are inferior, this is the opportunity to correct that impression.

There are many officers in public information work who are not only competent, but highly valuable. They are doing a top job. They have top teams of enlisted men under them and are doing sparkling jobs of turning out readable copy for the press, radio and other media. But as was pointed out in the beginning, you cannot make a writer. There are those who take no interest in such work and consequently cannot help being more or less disinterested in the work regardless of how hard they try.

As one competent officer, a college journalism graduate, incidentally, recently put it when informed that he was being transferred from public information to line duty, "God help my boys . . . The man they're sending me as a relief admits that the only thing he knows about newspapers is how to buy them off the news stand!" **USMC**

## In Brief

*Regular Navy recruit input* at Great Lakes Naval Training Center is expected to increase from the late 1949 rate of under 500 to about 1,000 monthly. Provisions have also been made to keep a total of 200 Naval Reserve recruits under training. During June, July, and August the reservist total will increase to 1,000. Reservists, drawn from all parts of the U. S. except the Pacific Coast states, get a two-week abridgment of the regular 12-week recruit training.

*The Navy has granted authority* to specific commands to order qualified Volunteer Reservists to two weeks' annual training duty with pay, within limits of available funds. This latest directive amends the curtailment of such duty as announced last fall when utilization of funds had exceeded normal expenditures and the cutback was necessary because the final amount of funds had not been established. Specified commands for issuing these orders are the Commandants of all Naval Districts, the Commandant of the Potomac River Naval Command, the Chief of Naval Air Reserve Training, and all commanding officers of naval air stations conducting reserve air training.


*The XC-123, twin-engine troops and cargo carrying transport*, built by Chase Aircraft Company of West Trenton, N. J., designed expressly for the transport of cargo, can be converted for use as a troop transport or evacuation transport. As a personnel carrier, the ship can accommodate 60 fully-equipped troops or 50 litter patients, six ambulatory patients and six medical attendants. Two release mechanisms in both the nose and tail of the ship make it possible for the ship to be used as a glider or as a tow plane for gliders weighing up to 30,000 lbs. The plane has a maximum speed of 220 mph and a maximum range of 850 miles.



*The Consolidated Vultee XP5Y-1*, the Navy's ultra fast patrol plane, is nearing completion at the San Diego, Calif., plant. Grossing more than 60 tons, the XP5Y-1 is the largest flying boat ever built by Consolidated, which created the famed PBY Catalina and the PB2Y Coronado sky fleets. Four Allison propeller-turbine engines will give the X5PY-1 more power per pound of airplane weight than some modern fighter planes. Features of advanced design, representing almost a decade of hydrodynamic research, are a high length-beam ratio hull, high wing, single-fin tail, and comfortable interior fittings to improve crew efficiency on long search-rescue or antisubmarine missions.

*Two huge mobile battery chargers* for submarines, each of which will be installed in a 50-ton railroad boxcar, are now being built for the U. S. Navy by the General Electric Company. The units, one for the east coast and one for the west coast, will be used to charge electrical batteries from which submarines draw power for underwater operations. The mobile chargers will be rolled alongside docked submarines and used for recharging the batteries from shore power sources.

*The first Armed Forces Day* will be observed throughout the nation on a community level on 20 May, the Department of Defense announced recently. The third Saturday in May was selected by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, and approved by President Truman, as Armed Forces Day to replace the days formerly observed by individual services. "Teamed for Defense" has been designated the official slogan for the day. Troop and equipment participation will be provided to as many communities as possible. A national allocation of naval vessel, plus certain types of aircraft and airborne troops, will be made to assure participation of personnel and equipment in as many cities as possible.



*Realistic ground training* for Air Force pilots will soon be provided by a new electronic training device—the Link Jet Instrument Trainer—which is designed to simulate all of the problems and flight conditions encountered by pilots flying high-speed jet aircraft. Manufactured by Link Aviation, Incorporated, Binghamton, New York, the trainer does not move on its fixed base but includes all of the controls, instruments, and indications of a high speed aircraft with rates of roll, climb, and acceleration duplicated. It is essentially a combination of three trainers—flight, engine operation, and radio navigation—and has a cockpit arrangement conforming closely with the actual cockpit of a jet fighter.

*A two year tour* of duty with the reserves for all regular officers of the military services has been ordered by Secretary of Defense Johnson. Secretary Johnson pointed out that reserve components comprise the bulk of our fighting forces in time of mobilization. It is therefore believed necessary that the regular officers, who will actually weld the regular and reserve components together, become familiar with the problems, state of training, and psychological outlook of the reserves.

*Water has replaced heavy shot bags as ballast* in experimental Fairchild C-119 Packets now being flight-tested at the Fairchild Aircraft Division at Hagerstown, Md. The use of water ballast for stability and control tests on the new U. S. Air Force cargo and troop transport planes is a unique system developed by Fairchild flight test engineers specifically for the C-119 airplane from an original conception by the Air Force. The new water ballast system reduces the time for dumping fuel ballast, permits quicker shifting of ballast in flight, and allows the load to be subjected to as much as a 90-degree bank.

*A flight simulator* to "flight test" a new airplane before it has been constructed has been built for the Navy by engineers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. With the machine, test engineers are able to set up an invisible electrical "model" of any aircraft or guided missile in an advanced stage of design, and then apply an autopilot to "fly" the nonexistent, theoretical craft. The machine is a combination of intricate electronic and mechanical equipment. With its control equipment it occupies a large part of a laboratory room at MIT. Because it enables engineers to study some of the flight characteristics of any given design before construction is begun, the simulator is expected to help in improving aircraft design.

*The Air Force's XF-91* high altitude interceptor has completed the first phase of its experimental flight tests, according to a joint announcement made here by the USAF and Republic Aviation Corporation, builder of the airplane. Republic engineers called the results of the tests "spectacular." The radically designed aircraft, which has wings wider at the tips than at the fuselage, is powered by a General Electric J-47 turbojet, plus a system of increasing the engines "thrust" or driving force by burning extra fuel in the exhaust system. This is called "exhaust reheat." The G-E jet engine produces 5200 pounds of thrust.

*The North American YF-86D*, latest model of the Air Force's "Sabre," recently completed its first flight at Muroc AFB, Muroc, Calif. Designed to climb quickly to extreme altitudes for interception missions, the F-86D is powered by a General Electric J-47 jet engine equipped with an afterburner. The YF-86D differs from its record-holder predecessor by having an air intake duct under the nose instead of in the center of the nose, and it has a larger after fuselage section to house its more powerful jet engine. Previous models are powered by a J-47 engine without the afterburner.



# Marines and Sailors

## *An Account of the*

*"My Dear Madam,*

*In the present state of alarm, I imagine it will be more convenient to dispense with the enjoyment of your hospitality today, and therefore pray you to admit this as an excuse for Mr Jones, Lucy and myself. Mr Jones is deeply engaged in dispatching the marines and attending to the public duties . . .*

*Yours very truly and affectionately,  
E. Jones."*

• THIS LETTER WAS WRITTEN TO DOLLY MADISON, the President's wife, by Mrs Jones, the wife of the Secretary of the Navy. The state of alarm that postponed so important an occasion as dinner at the White House was the presence of the British before Washington. It was August 24, 1814 and the British were to capture and burn Washington that day.

The Marines took part in the defense, but Washington was burned in spite of them, Capt Samuel Miller, USMC, and about 120 marines did their best, but there were just too many redcoats.

The story had started two months before when LtCol Commandant Wharton organized at Marine Barracks, Washington, a battalion of Marines for field service. 1stLt Samuel Miller was placed in command of this unit, the composition and size of which is not definitely known.<sup>1</sup> The men of the battalion having been previously trained to serve 12-pounders as artillerists, they were able to function in the field as infantry or artillery.

The opportunity to show this double skill soon came. The British fleet under Adm Cockburn had been sailing at will on Chesapeake Bay, opposed only by a small fleet of gunboats under Commodore Joshua Barney. In early June the gunboats had been chased into St. Leonard's Creek and there blockaded by the British; it thus appeared only a matter of time before a further attack by the British in greater force would eliminate Barney's flotilla. In an effort to raise this blockade and to permit

<sup>1</sup> Approximately 120

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**By Maj Frederick S. Aldridge**

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Barney freedom of movement the Secretary of the Navy ordered the Commandant to send the Marine battalion to St Leonard's Bay.

In cooperation with Barney's flotillamen, and a force of Army regulars, Capt<sup>2</sup> Miller's battalion with their three 12-pounders repulsed a British attempt to land. The British force, faced with unexpected opposition, gave up the blockade and sailed downstream.

Mission accomplished! The battalion was recalled on July 2 to the Marine Barracks in Washington by the Commandant. Barney moved his flotilla farther up the Patuxent River, nearer Washington.

President Madison and his Cabinet were uncertain of the intentions of the British and invented any number of courses of action for their enemies — Annapolis, Baltimore, and the Capitol, all being possible objectives. John Armstrong, the Secretary of War, was convinced that Baltimore was the British goal. When on August 19 the British landed at Benedict, Md., it became evident that their objective was Washington. Their intended route of approach to the city, however, was unknown to the Americans and was to remain so for some time.

• FROM the moment that the British landed at Benedict until the Americans abandoned the field at Bladensburg everybody, yes, everybody, stuck his finger into the pie of "how to beat the British." BrigGen William Winder, in charge of the defenses of Washington, attempted to be his own liaison officer with the scattered elements of his forces and had worn out several horses and himself before the battle near Bladensburg even started. James Monroe, Secretary of State, spent his time lurking around the fringes of the British force, sending back misinformation to the American forces. The Secretary of War was a man with many plans and these plans came in rapid succession. President Madison, wearing a cockade and armed with a pair of duelling pistols, looked martial indeed — until his pistols were stolen.

While all these personalities were busying themselves in the above fashion, the Marines were preparing for the field. Capt Miller and his battalion left Washington

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<sup>2</sup> Miller had been promoted.

# Defend Washington

## *Battle of Bladensburg*

and marched off to the east to join Commodore Barney at Woodyard, a few miles west of Upper Marlboro. The battalion's strength at this time was six officers, six sergeants, seven corporals, six musics, and 78 privates — a total of 103 officers and men. Three 12-pounders and two 18-pounders, all on mobile mounts, were taken along. The heavier guns were brought along specifically for the use of Barney's flotillamen.

The flotillamen were ashore and at Woodyard inasmuch as their ships had been burned by order of Commodore Barney in order to prevent their falling into the hands of the British (shades of Benedict Arnold's Lake Champlain fleet).


Commodore Barney's force now joined with the army of Gen Winder as it stood in the path of British Gen Robert Ross and his army of 4,270. How large was Winder's army? His "paper" army or the troops that Winder should have had was one thing — what he actually had was another. On paper he had various degrees of control over 10,000 troops; he actually had about 6000 in the field.<sup>3</sup>

Winder retreated from Woodyard to Battalion Old Fields on August 23 and established a line — the sailors and marines being on the right side of the line. As soon as it became obvious to Winder that the left wing of his army (under BrigGen Tobias Stansbury) was not marching from Bladensburg to join him, he decided to get back to Washington before either he was attacked by superior numbers, or Gen Ross bypassed him and hit the Americans elsewhere.

Gen Winder moved his force back across the east



<sup>3</sup> This included fragments of two regiments, under Colonels Beall and Hood, of roughly 750 men; two regiments of Baltimore men under BrigGen Tobias Stansbury, with a strength of approximately 1500; two regiments of United States regulars, the 36th and 38th, of only 300 men; and two regiments of Georgetown and District of Columbia militia in the strength of 1070 men, with 12 six-pounders, under BrigGen Walter Smith, known as the Columbian Brigade. In addition, there were several separate battalions, away from their parent regiments, such as Waring's of the Prince George's regiment and Maynard's and Kramer's battalions. With Barney's flotillamen and Miller's marines added to this conglomerate force, it appears that Winder had 5,938 men — but his units were scattered and difficult to control.



branch of the Potomac (Anacostia River) into Washington, and the Marines spent the night at the Marine Barracks.

The next day, August 24, was the big day. After a feint directly at Washington from Battalion Old Fields the British general marched his troops upstream on the Maryland side to Bladensburg where the river crossing would be less difficult. When he arrived at the town that proved to be the key to the American capital there was no longer a problem with the river. Stansbury and his Baltimore troops had abandoned the most defensible position to the East of the river (Lowndes Hill). To make the British task even easier Stansbury had pulled

his infantry back out of musket range of the bridge.

When Gen Winder learned of the British move toward Bladensburg (10:00 A. M.) he ordered the Washington troops to march to Bladensburg.

Commodore Barney and his force of seamen and Marines who since early morning had been fortifying the bridge over the east branch were left behind in Washington to dispute any crossing of the river by the British.<sup>4</sup>

Fortunately the Secretary of the Navy came by, and when Barney had finished airing his views on how things were run, Mr William Jones was only too glad to send Barney and his men after Winder to Bladensburg. A few marines stayed at the bridge to destroy the structure if it became necessary.

When Barney and the rest of his troops from Washington arrived near Bladensburg, the Baltimore militia under Stansbury were already in their position several hundred yards to the west of the river. The British were still on the other side of the east branch. The position that the Washington troops took was not bad—assumed more by good luck than forethought. But this

position as finally taken, by what was to be the right wing of the American army, had no tie-in with the left wing; and the two positions were not mutually supporting. This defect was to be largely instrumental in permitting the British to defeat the divided Americans in detail.

Barney had galloped down the road, seen the position he wanted, and had ordered the 18 and 12-pounders into position. Capt Miller's marines and the seamen not needed to serve the heavy guns took position as infantry to the right of the guns.

To the left of the guns most of the Washington brigade

<sup>4</sup> Now known as Barney's Circle.

was formed along the slope of the hill. To the right (southeast) of Barney, on an abrupt hill, the Beall-Hood regiment of 750 infantry was formed. To the front the ground sloped and then dropped suddenly into a ravine; but there was a broad space before the ravine that permitted a field of fire. The guns could rake the road, the bridge, and the tip of the ravine on either side. It didn't look bad — except that the boys up front in Stansbury's outfit never were informed that there were more American troops to their right rear.

Gen Ross' light brigade marched across the bridge. We won't concern ourselves with the American left wing except to say it didn't last long.<sup>5</sup>

After the second line of the left wing had melted and the militia were obviously going in the wrong direction, it was Gen Winder's hope to channel the retreating troops over to extend the left of BrigGen Walter Smith's right wing.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Stansbury's position was untenable once the British crossed the river.

<sup>6</sup> Without control, it was difficult for Winder to get Stansbury's retreating and disorganized forces to move to join Smith. Winder was actually on the ground with some of Stansbury's units and gave them orders to withdraw. Instead of moving to join Smith, however, most of the units moved via the Georgetown road, allowing the British to drive between them and Smith's brigade.

About this time the rapidly advancing British had marched up the road and prepared to attack their third American line of the afternoon. In numbers both sides now theoretically were closely matched (3,880 Americans to 4,020 British). Just what percentage of these troops were actually committed is uncertain. The Americans did have all the advantage of big guns and the British in turn had their rockets<sup>7</sup> — the latter soon to be immortalized in the *Star Spangled Banner* as "the rockets red glare."<sup>8</sup>


The British first hit Smith's delaying force of 240 men under Kramer. This group fell back and took up positions on Beall's right flank.

And now Commodore Barney went to work. The British, having cleared Kramer with their skirmishers, marched in heavy column boldly up the road. Commodore Barney jumped off his horse and aimed each of his pieces himself. When the British saw Barney's battery, they halted. As Commodore Barney described it: "I

When Gen Winder saw what was happening he moved to join his right wing.

<sup>7</sup> The American troops were unfamiliar with the Congreve rocket. Its psychological effect was tremendous.

<sup>8</sup> In the defense of Baltimore. See *The Rockets Red Glare*, Marine Corps GAZETTE, July 1949.





reserved our fire. In a few minutes the enemy advanced, when I ordered an 18-pounder to be fired, which completely cleared the road." But these Britishers had been the Duke of Wellington's in Spain and had already overrun three batteries that day. They came on again. Twice more they were repulsed by Barney's force. The Congreve rockets that had so shaken Stansbury's troop failed to demoralize Barney's men.

By now even the British Invincibles had their fill of attacking up a road. In the ravine they formed into line of battle, and advanced on a broad front up the slope across the broken ground. Barney's right flank was their objective. Again Barney's guns went to work; but the British were more dispersed this time, and it was to be a line of men like themselves that was to stop them.

Capt Samuel Miller, his marines, and the flotillamen stood up to the British face to face across a few yards of ground and traded ounce balls.

Many of its officers having fallen, the British light brigade stopped, broke, and fled back to the ravine. The marines and flotillamen pursued them, shouting, "Board 'em."

After this successful local counterattack Barney's force returned to its position and to the guns on the slope. Capt Samuel Miller had been wounded in the severe fire fight.

The American situation on the right wing at this moment looked good. Barney had been successful and the rest of the right wing had not been attacked except for Kramer's troops which had given a good account of themselves.

The British East Essex Regiment (the 44th) realized that the left of the American line rested on open air and made for it. This was not too serious a situation as

BrigGen Walter Smith immediately ordered his reserve under Col Brent to move to the left in order to counter this threat.

Then Gen Winder went to work. We left him unhappy over the dissolution of his left wing; now the general set about defeating his own right wing. Without moving up to observe how well his men were holding, Gen Winder passed the order to Gen Smith to retreat.

In good formations, almost disbelieving the order, the troops to the left of Barney marched away from their good positions. Some, amazed, stopped and had to be again ordered to leave the field.

Commodore Barney was left to hold the entire field except for the knob on his right, still occupied by Col Beall's troops. The Commodore apparently expected much support from their (Col Beall's) fine situation.

THE BRITISH, having learned to respect the marines and seamen, sent forward their sharpshooters to harass Barney's force while making a simultaneous attempt to outflank the right of Barney's position. Col Beall's men fired a volley or two and abandoned the field. The marines and flotillamen were now the only force that remained between the British and the National Capital.

Barney's command had turned their guns toward this attempt on their right and held their own although taking casualties — Commodore Barney receiving at this time a severe wound in the thigh.

Commodore Barney described the scene — "We had the whole enemy army to contend with, our ammunition was expended — finding the enemy now completely in our rear, and no means of defense, I gave order to my officers and men to retire."

Some escaped to participate later in the defense of Baltimore. The rest including Commodore Barney and Capt Miller fell into the hands of the British, but were treated well by their captors and soon exchanged.

The British had this to say about the Battle of Bladensburg:

"But the fact is, that, with the exception of a party of sailors from the gun boats (and marines), under the command of Commodore Barney, no troops could behave worse than they (Americans) did. The skirmishers were driven in as soon as attacked, the first line gave way without offering the slightest resistance, and the left of the main body was broken within half an hour after it was seriously engaged. Of the sailors, however, it would be injustice not to speak in the terms which their conduct merits. They were employed as gunners, and not only did they serve their guns with a quickness and precision which astonished their assailants, but they stood till some of them were actually bayoneted, with fuses in their hands; nor was it till their leader was wounded and taken, and they saw themselves deserted on all sides by the soldiers, that they quitted the field."

USMC

# U.S. Frogmen

LAST MONTH THE GAZETTE PRESENTED PICTURES OF British frogmen being trained at the Royal Marine Amphibious School. This month the GAZETTE turns to our own Navy's frogmen.


First introduced during the North African invasion in 1942, pioneer units specializing in pre-assault demolition work have emerged from their speculative beginning into a recognized body of specialists necessary to most amphibious operations. First known as amphibious scouts and later as naval combat demolition units, the under-water demolition teams—or UDTs for short—made an enviable record for themselves in World War II.

Of the 33 UDTs maintained at the close of World War II, only four teams remain today. Their personnel comprises expert and specifically trained volunteers, enlisted annually by request throughout the Navy. Upon selection, candidates are put through a rigid 10 weeks of training, designed to develop physical endurance, stability, and knowledge of their mission. Before completing the 10 weeks course, the men must be able to swim one mile without swimming aids and be experts in under-water operations. From an original entry of 120 men, about 30 or 40 may be expected to receive their "swimming fins." USMC




► Daily swims combined with problems involving obstacle destruction keep men in top condition.

► Peacetime training combines lessons learned in World War II with many postwar developments.



► Obstacles may be removed with little danger to the swimmers by using timer on floating demolition pack.

► Swimmer is retrieved aboard small rubber craft while master boat speeds along at 10 or 12 knots.





## Operational Controls For Restaurants, Soda Fountains, And Bars

By LtCol Glenn D. Morgan

THE VARIOUS POST EXCHANGE COUNCILS AND THE boards of governors of officers and NCO clubs are continually faced with the necessity of improving the profits or services of their restaurants, soda fountains, or bars. Lots of meeting time is used discussing ways and means for these activities to pay out. Magic formulas are tried, amateur experts contribute their ideas, and finally the governing bodies themselves jump in to give a hand. There results a state of confusion which defies the powers of a modern day Houdini.

The writer, an inexpert amateur who had to find out for himself, suggests the placement of complete responsibility on department heads, designation of but one boss for them to work under, and the establishment of depart-

mental controls which will accurately reflect the efficiency of those in charge.

The departmental controls indicated below will assist in breaking the total operation into its component parts so that it can be more easily examined in detail. They will provide a basis on which to commence the study for improvement of profits or services. None of the controls are new and all are in current use in both civilian and military establishments.

### Restaurant Controls

ACCOUNTANTS OF LARGE CAFETERIAS and hotel dining rooms begin with the food department by first determining the ratio of cost of food and supplies used in the

## Magic formulas alone will not increase profits or improve service. Department heads must be made responsible and answerable to one person. Workable controls should be established to provide immediate checks. Such controls will help promote efficiency

galley to credits received from sales thereof. An essential requirement is the separation of the food and supply storerooms and lockers from the restaurant and the issue by voucher of these items by the storeroomkeeper as they are needed. This provides two desirable controls. Firstly, the storeroomkeeper<sup>1</sup> begins the period with an inventory of fixed value, he adds to it his purchases,<sup>2</sup> and then he receives his credits for issues plus credits for surveys made by the officer-in-charge; thus, his ending physical inventory<sup>3</sup> should coincide exactly with the book value. Secondly, the separation of the restaurant from the storerooms and cold lockers,<sup>4</sup> makes it possible to determine at any time throughout the accounting period, and particularly at the end of the period, the direct relationship between the cost of food and supplies used and the total credits received from sales to customers or free meals to employees. In a restaurant serving meals at an average sell price of 60 cents the cost of food and supplies used in the galley should never be more than 65 per cent of the credits received. Dining rooms which serve meals averaging \$1.25 or more should have food and supply costs of from 40 per cent to 50 per cent of credits received.

The results of these controls should be reported to the governing bodies at the close of each business period. There is no acceptable explanation for storeroom shortages and changes in operators should be made if they continue. The gross profit operation of the galley places responsibility for the efficiency and honesty of that department directly on the one in charge. Gross restaurant percentages should never vary more than a per cent or two.

### Fountain Controls

THE SATISFACTORY OPERATION of a soda fountain requires the separation of merchandise into two separate accounts—a cost operation and a merchandise operation. Articles which are packaged and upon which a fixed sell price is established, including sandwiches transferred from the restaurant, should be charged into the fountain steward's account at their sell price (to ledger account

<sup>1</sup>In an operation of less than 10 employees, the assistant to the steward should double as the storeroom keeper.

<sup>2</sup>In order to simplify accounting, meat can be purchased already cut. If not, sides or quarters should be butchered and cuts packaged and priced. Meat should be charged into storeroom at price indicated on packages.

<sup>3</sup>In order to facilitate inventorying, unit cost prices should be marked in crayon on packaged and canned goods.

<sup>4</sup>Galleys should have ice boxes for storage of day to day issues from cold lockers.

at cost). Sales for these articles should be rung on a separate register key, or on a separate register so that correct figures for packaged sales can be determined and credited to the fountain steward's account. Thus, at the end of the accounting period, the inventory at sell should be the same as the value carried on the steward's account. Sales figures entered on the ledger account will show the gross profit for the fountain merchandise department (at minimum markup, about 22 per cent). The governing body should be informed as to the merchandise shortage at the end of each period. Shortages in excess of 3/10 of one per cent of total merchandise sales on the fountain should be investigated.

The cost operation of the fountain should include only those items whose quantity in relation to sell price is variable. The receipts from such sales must be recorded separately from receipts for merchandise sales. The fountain operation should be charged with the cost price of all items used on the fountain: ice cream, nuts, syrups, napkins, paper cups, wooden spoons, etc. Accurate inventories coupled with correct charges to the department will result in a determination of per cent of fountain supply cost to cash receipts. The percentage from one period to another should not vary more than a per cent or two. The percentage for each business period should be reported to the governing body who will determine the efficiency of the operation by comparison with percentages for previous periods.

### Bar Controls

BAR OPERATIONS in NCO and Officers' clubs present a challenge to the clubs' managers and governing bodies. Careful supervision, precise inventories, and three important controls are necessary.

#### Gross Percentage Control

It is an accepted principle that basic ingredients are charged into the bar steward's account at their calculated or listed sell price and into the ledger account at cost price. Supplies are not charged to the steward's account but are recorded in the ledger account at cost. Thus the ledger account, with the proper inventory figures, debit cost figures for supplies and materials, and credits for

*Last month LtCol Morgan, in Profit Ideas For Exchange Councils, presented solutions to some of the knotty problems which arise in the operation of Marine Exchanges.*



**"No, this isn't today's dollar blue plate special. I work in this hostess house."**

sales, will show the gross profit. This should be expressed as a per cent of total bar sales and reported to the governing body at the close of each accounting period. A reference standard for the operation can then be established for future comparisons.

#### Bar Steward's Account

The second bar control is established by setting up a bar steward's account. Basic ingredients and packaged merchandise (cigarettes, etc.) are charged in at a sell price. Supplies to the bar are not charged to the steward's account. Inventories must be made weekly and at the close of the period by the management to determine the possibilities of carelessness or dishonesty. A good operation will result if the following points are adhered to:

1. Every sale contains one, seldom two, and rarely three basic ingredients. However, whether there is one or three basic ingredients, the total quantity of the one or three is usually the same. Thus, the formula used to compute the sell price of basic ingredients issued to bars should be as follows—assuming one ounce measures are used.<sup>5</sup>

Quart (32 oz) : Thirty times the unit sell price of the item in which it is most commonly used.

Fifths (25 $\frac{3}{5}$  oz) : Twenty-four times the unit sell price of the item in which it is most commonly used.

2. The issue of supply items such as fruits, juices, eggs, milk, napkins, straws, and mixes or flavorings such as bitters, seltzers, ginger ale, coca cola, should not be entered on the steward's account, but should appear in the bar ledger account at cost. Weekly and final inventories should be compared with the steward's account on dates taken and the record thereof submitted to the governing

<sup>5</sup>Using one and one fourth ounce measures the multiplication factors change to: Quarts—24, Fifths—19.

body. There is no reason for an inventory shortage. A natural overage will result from the sale of straight coca colas and ginger ales. The spillage allowance is greater than that allowed in the large hotel bars.

3. A storeroom account should be established for bottled goods and mixes. Perpetual inventory cards should be maintained at average cost price and entries to the perpetual inventory cards should be substantiated by references to invoices or vouchers. This will provide two checks on the storeroom—a check in dollar value between actual and book inventories and an actual bottle check by comparing the inventory count with the perpetual stock records. The results of these checks should be reported to the governing body. A good operation will never have a shortage or overage in this storeroom.

The controls indicated above provide a check on the possible theft or misuse of supplies and what might be called "raw materials." These are the items which are difficult to tie down and which have a habit of disappearing. When the misuse or theft of materials actually shows against the efficiency operation of a department, the person in charge will see that such practices are discontinued. However, frequent check must be made to ensure that operators do not cheat the customers in order to cover inefficiencies.

The governing body should require that miscellaneous costs (laundry, etc.) and wages be apportioned correctly to the departments. This will provide a departmental net profit figure. If a departmental net profit figure is unsatisfactory the governing body can reduce the quality of service provided with a resultant reduction in wage costs to the department. In fact, all costs above actual basic costs can be effectively controlled by the governing body. Responsibility for basic costs should be placed on the head of the department. These key persons should be well paid and top performance from each should be demanded.

US MC

# How Would You Do It?

By 1stLt Harold H. Nebenzahl

During the Marianas Campaign I was attached to the regimental intelligence section of the 6th Marines, 2d Marine Division, in capacity of Japanese language interpreter. The Division was unusually well indoctrinated in intelligence procedure and, as a rule, the various intelligence sections at the different command levels were swamped with diaries, maps, and every conceivable type of Japanese printed matter. There was even a commendable eagerness on the part of the troops to bring prisoners in for interrogation. However, during one phase of the operations on Mt Tapotchau on Saipan there was a dearth of prisoners in our section which lasted for several days. As many of the readers will recall, the Japanese even removed corpses under the cover of night.

In our quest for prisoners, we redoubled our efforts to induce the Japanese to surrender by means of portable public address systems. However, all mention of cigarettes, chocolate, and medical care was in vain.

I was just preparing to crawl into my hole for the night when I was alerted by excited shouts of "Get the 'interpretater'!" With some degree of anticipation I emerged and was greeted with the sight of two marines halfway carrying and pushing a completely hysterical Japanese soldier. I don't think the man had been mistreated but evidently he expected death by being crushed by a steamroller or by some other American refinement. My attempts to quiet him by speaking Japanese only produced an even greater outburst of hysterical shrieks and a downpour of bitter tears. It was only then, in the evening half-light that I realized this man was not a Japanese soldier but a Korean Rodosha; namely a noncombatant Korean who was enrolled in one of the Japanese labor battalions. These people were an unusually good source of intelligence because they had been removed from their native villages against their will by the Japanese

military, and were usually treated shoddily, if not brutally. They were invariably well-acquainted with the Japanese fortification system because most of the time they themselves had been instrumental in digging the trenches, underground tunnels, and bunkers which studded the Japanese-held islands.

For historical reasons they considered the Americans as friends and when the opportunity presented itself they deserted to our side in great numbers. The majority of them spoke Japanese fluently but no matter how I threatened, cajoled, or attempted to placate this man, I couldn't persuade him to settle down. Marine Corps interpreters had all been taught a number of Korean combat phrases. For instance, "Koreans, you are our friends. Come to our side," "Come forward waving a white flag, we will not harm you," etc. However, throughout the entire campaign it had never been necessary to use a single phrase of Korean. Being suddenly confronted with the necessity of using these unfamiliar Korean phrases, I encountered a complete mental blank. I couldn't recall a single Korean combat phrase. What to do? It was then that my social contact with a Korean secretary at the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard paid off. I boldly stepped up to the man and shouted: "*Na nun tang shin ul sarang hamnida!*"

The meaning of these words quite naturally did not register with him immediately and it was only after I repeated the phrase several times that he stopped sniffling, got up off his knees and, with a completely insane grin of relief, rushed up and attempted to embrace me.

After we unloaded our C ration biscuits and lemonade powder on him, we were able to interrogate him in halting, careful Japanese, the man supplying information which proved quite valuable.

What I had said to him was, "I love you," in Korean!

US MC

*The GAZETTE will pay \$25.00 for service-connected problems and their solution.*

# Marine Corps History —

By LtCol Robert D. Heinl, Jr.

FEW PROJECTS WITHIN THE MARINE CORPS HAVE been so subjected to the winds of chance, the vagaries of personality, and just plain misunderstanding and general ignorance, as has the Marine Corps historical program, together with its long-suffering executor, the Historical Division.

Among any four Marine officers, I venture to say, two will be unaware that a Marine Corps historical program exists; at least one will take it for granted that the Historical Division consists of a band of bearded dodderers or theorizing professors; and the inevitable card will snigger, "Oh, you mean the *Hysterical* Division . . ."

In all good reason, however, public attitude on the subject of Marine historical efforts is probably well founded, for although the Historical Division is now a Marine Corps Headquarters agency of some 30 years' standing, its first quarter-century was certainly not distinguished by activity, output, or even consistent long-term policy. During that time, moreover, it shifted, chameleon-like from administrative entity to entity, flickering from the Adjutant and Inspector's Department to Personnel Department to Division of Public Information — and as late as 1949, believe it or not, a serious proposal was put forward to incorporate the Historical Section in the Division of Recruiting. Following a sine-curve, like a charge of alternating current, it has been

**BrigGen Clayton C. Jerome, Director of Marine Corps History, consults with Assistant Director, LtCol Gordon D. Gayle on map to be used in official monograph on Peleliu.**



first a section, then a division, then again a section, and now — permanently, one hopes — a division.

The zero milestone of the Historical Division's tangled history is 8 September 1919, when, by Marine Corps Order No. 53 (Series 1919), of the Major General Commandant, George Barnett, the Historical Section came into existence as a tiny sub-agency of the Adjutant and Inspector's Department. The first officer-in-charge of the Section was Maj Edwin N. McClellan.

The rather limited concept of the precise character and aims of a Marine historical program then evidently entertained at Headquarters is plain from the parent organization to which the Section was assigned.

"History" (must have run some administrator's train of musings) "is evidently based on records and archives — files, perhaps I should say . . . the A&I keeps the files here at Headquarters . . . q.e.d., this Historical Section ought to belong to the A&I . . ."

(Or perhaps the lack of a general and special staff organization — in which History falls neatly into a special staff slot — simply shunted the baby Section into the most likely catch-all parent unit.)

And so, during the years before World War II, the Historical Section drowsed among the files. During this period, thanks largely to the continuity of effort provided by a diligent Chief Clerk, Mr James F. Jenkins, the Section did in fact make some effort to exploit and collate early Marine Corps records in the National Archives; and an imposing project for a multi-volume history of the Corps was set on foot by one officer-in-charge. It is typical of the way things used to be that this program (which actually attained the status of bound and mimeographed draft for early chapters) languished when the individual sponsor was detached, and its mute surviving manuscript may be seen today unfinished as it stood in the early '30s.

It is also typical of the general lack of program and direction in Marine histori-

# Report to the Stockholders

Photos by Cpl Joseph J. Mulvihill and PFC Harry F. Grabsch

cal matters of this period that one of the most constructive steps to be taken originated—not in the Historical Section<sup>1</sup> at all, but of all places, in the Muster Roll Division of Marine Corps Headquarters. This was the decision to send a research clerk to work through the files of the War Department for personnel data bearing on Marines who had served in France with Marine units attached to the AEF. Through the assiduity of this search, which was destined to consume some 10 years on the part of Mr. Joel D. Thacker (who ultimately, 1944, succeeded Jenkins), it was discovered that the bulk of the Army's World War I records pertaining to operations of the Marine Brigade in France were in danger of dissipation, loss, and disinterest. Largely as a result of Thacker's work, the calamity was averted, the records were assembled, and the collection transferred to Marine Corps cognizance. That the very absence of any comprehensive World War I archive on the Marine Corps had hardly been realized before 1930, and that the whole question arose only as a result of the administrative need for muster roll corrections, speaks volumes.

One product of the prewar Historical Section, which may perhaps be charged to the credit side, is the one-volume Marine Corps history prepared by Col. Metcalfe. Whatever its literary qualities, or its lack of documentation (an omission which would justify professional historians in dismissing it as not being proper history at all), the Metcalfe history, published in 1939, gave the

Marine Corps something of a later date than the 1900 text by Col. Collum, heretofore the latest history of the Corps (and, for its vintage, by no means a bad one).

As one looks back over the first two decades of the Historical Section, the salient impression is one of planlessness, or possibly of functional uncertainty.

In light of what we now consider necessary, the historical program of an armed service includes several well defined functions. These, as we now see them, are:

- (1) Maintenance of historical archives.
- (2) Preparation and publication of definite official narratives.
- (3) Operation of a working reference-collection.
- (4) Applied research to provide answers to historical questions which originate either within the service, or the general public.
- (5) Encouragement of semi-official or private historical research of military value.
- (6) Arrangements for collection, preservation and display of historical objects.
- (7) Establishment of a specialist reserve historical component.


Applying the yardstick of these seven functions to the Historical Section of years past brings to light amazing gaps and fluctuations.

Levels of retained archival matter rose and fell, and

**Chief fact finder and research man of long standing in Historical Division is Mr. Joel D. Thacker who is often assisted in research matters by Mrs. Hattie P. Hobbs.**

<sup>1</sup>Still another important Marine historical venture of the late Twenties originated, flourished and died without coming under cognizance of the Historical Section. This was the project whereby Capt. John W. Thomason, Jr., the most gifted writer ever to wear a Marine uniform, was assigned to the task of preparing (for joint Army-Marine use) an official history of the 2d Division, AEF, in which the Marine Brigade had fought its way to glory. Capt. Thomason produced an able draft (still unpublished) which proved unacceptable for inter-Service reasons. The point to consider, however, is that this work proceeded entirely beyond the purview of the Historical Section.





Latest operational monograph to be published by the Historical Division is Guadalcanal, not shown here. Purple Heart veterans may receive free copy of monograph on operation in which they participated by writing to Assistant Director of Marine Corps History.



the filing methods used to catalog documents seem to have been mainly of the W. C. Fields type. Projects for getting out definitive, official Marine Corps history were strewn along the trail from year to year, no one consistent with its predecessor. Indeed, the remains of several may be seen today where they fell, like the bleached skulls of longhorn cattle amid the sagebrush. For a time, the Marine Corps actually had a Headquarters Library, but this was long since dispersed, and many historical reference works vanished into various offices, or were sent to the library of Marine Corps Schools. By 1940, at the suggestion of Col Metcalfe, a former officer-in-charge of the Historical Section, the Marine Corps Museum was established in Quantico — but without any ties to the Historical Section, and seemingly without any very clearly defined status at all. Prior to 1948, no historical reserve organization existed. Only in the field of applied research, in fact, did the Historical Section really follow any consistent policy — and this was simply to "look up the answer" to any historical question presented to it.

• THIS ABILITY to "look up" things tended to bog down, divert and impede whatever long-term policies the Historical Section may have attempted to follow, because — especially in a Headquarters era marked by seeming incomprehension of the *raisons d'être* for a historical organization — the Section simply became a catchall for every question that nobody knew what to do with. If one of the front-office Aides received a letter in French, why just have the Historical Section write the answer. You want statistics on how many Marines come from Kansas? Go down and ask the Hysterical Section — they don't have anything else to do . . .

And in 1942, when the deluge came, the Historical Division (it was a division now) was just about as ready to perform vastly increased, and ever increasing historical functions as the foregoing narrative would indicate.

The Division's wartime status as a whistle-stop in what was about to become the Personnel Department, prevented its needs from ever receiving very much consideration, and an almost 100 per cent lack of professional historical guidance rather precluded clear visualization on its own part of what the Division ought to be doing, or how to do it. Because the Marine Corps was very properly concerned with fighting a war (and mainly on a shoe-string, compared with other services), personnel-wise the Historical Division had to take what it could get. Because the Fleet Marine Force was understandably far more preoccupied with the next battle than with the last, little if any systematic program for historical coverage (or even accumulation of crucial documents) prevailed. As an example, officers of the 1st Marine Amphibious Corps can recall the burning of many cubic feet of irreplaceable action reports and intelligence

photos connected with Central Solomons operations — simply because, for a field headquarters, the stuff seemed (and undoubtedly was) a burden both in mass and classification.

By 1945 — just in time for Okinawa — it finally became possible for the Historical Division to send forward combat historical officers and enlisted men with the assignment of "covering" the battle for posterity. This was a practice which public information activities in all services had long since developed to Himalayan heights; which, in the historical field, the U. S. Army had adopted as of 1942; and which the Germans — keen students of military history — had, from 1939 on, followed as a matter of course. For many reasons, including some of personality as well as of failure of adequate briefing for the field units concerned, even this belated Okinawa venture succeeded only in part, though its mistakes have served us well in present-day planning for future operational historical coverage.

DEMOBILIZATION hit everyone like a poleaxe, but it would be interesting to find any other Marine Corps activity more peculiarly flattened by the sequelae of demobilization than was the Historical Division. In the first place, practically all the personnel just went home (this happened everywhere). At this very moment, however, Marine Corps units and stations all over the terrestrial globe were boxing up tons of military records, virtually all of prime importance to any future student of the Marine Corps or of amphibious warfare.

And every ton of these classified, usually unique historical records began crashing down on the Historical Division, which at this very moment was in process of having its archives personnel reduced from one civilian and four WRs to two: a civil servant who likewise had to do all the multifarious day-to-day "looking up", and a so-called librarian. When the smoke cleared away, it was anybody's guess as to exactly how many World War II records had cascaded into Marine Corps Headquarters (not to mention Naval Records Management Centers all over the country), but 30 tons would be a conservative guess. Certainly it is a fact that, after your years of hard, continuous effort to rise up from under this immense load, the Historical Division still can only say, within broad limits, how much and just what kind of archival matter it possesses — and it will be many years before the exact contents of this vast trove are fully known and catalogued, let alone declassified.

In November 1946, the Historical Division reached a turning point in its wanderings. To anyone who took trouble to devote much thought to the Division's many and complex problems, it had long since become evident that the Personnel Department's Records Branch was not — on grounds of function — the most suitable parent entity for a historical organization supposed (in theory

Capt Charles W. Boggs, Jr., is preparing account of Marine Aviation participation in Philippines. Pins on map record air strikes.



at any rate) to commence prompt production of definitive, official Marine Corps history.

And it should be interjected here that events in the inter-service arena had by 1946 considerably sharpened many Marine officers' apprehension of the importance of accurate and carefully substantiated history, for the preservation of the Marine Corps.

Since the files somehow didn't seem quite the place for a historical organization, the next logical thought must have been that because Public Information had a good deal to do with writing, perhaps history — also much concerned with writing — might flourish more vigorously under the Public Information wing. On 1 November, 1946, therefore, the Historical Division again became a Section,<sup>2</sup> and was transferred to the Division of Public Information.

Regardless of the indisputable fact, functionally speaking, that the staff functions of history and public information possess about as much in common as do quarrying and sculpture, the Historical Section's removal to Public

<sup>2</sup>The constriction was not one of status only. As a division, it had been allocated six "bays" in Headquarters for archives space, all of which were filled to overflowing with World War II matter. One of the first decisions of a space-starved Public Information Division was that the Historical archives must be reduced (even by such Procrustean methods as burning — shades of IMAC!) to three "bays" for archives.

Two readers and one microfilm machine are important items of equipment to the Historical Division. By use of microfilm a permanent record of documents is provided, while storage space is greatly reduced.



Washington, D. C., Aug. 24, 1918.

Dear Sir,  
I have the honor to report that  
I this morning inspected the word weapon  
rooms, and quarters of the Navy and Marine  
Magazine Guards and found them in a  
very orderly condition.

Very respectfully,

Sam. L. Wilson

You don't mind,

Jack McPherson

U. S. Marine Corps

General Orders  
No. 15

Richmond, Va., April 22, 1918.

Records or Detachments of Marines when transferred under order, will, in all cases when practicable, be furnished with a box for the journey, before leaving their station. The commanding officer of Marines at the station, will be responsible for the execution of this order.

By order of Col. Ball.

Adjutant

Capt. G. H. Morris  
U. S. Marine Corps

Very truly

Sir

Major Samuel Wilson,

Adjutant and Inspector  
of Marines,

U. S. Marines.

we, as members of our cause, you were seen  
immediatamente ocupadas con un Ejército  
en derramamiento de sangre por ninguna  
causa.

Quedo encantado la contestación a' Uds.

Patria y Libertad

J. C. Sandino

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

14 August, 1919.

My dear General Barnett:

Thank you for your kind note. You may be sure it was a genuine pleasure to Mr. Wilson and me to review the splendid body of Marines who have just been mustered out of service. We are intensely proud of their whole record, and are glad to have had the whole world see how irresistible they are in their might when a cause which America holds dear is at stake.

The whole nation has reason to be proud of them.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

Woodrow Wilson

Major General George Barnett,  
Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.

Do not give out. It is  
personal, but I will let one  
tell.  
G. S. A.

Information exercised profound, and obliquely beneficial effects. Probably the foremost of these was the "put up or shut up" atmosphere pragmatically characteristic of public information work. Although sometimes shocking and bumptious to the Historical Section, life inside the concrete-mixer of Public Information was productive of the first comprehensive Marine Corps historical program ever to be conceived and pressed home into execution. It is this program which the Historical Division (now a Division again) is currently engaged in executing.

Because World War II looms so immense in the annals of the Corps, the present-day historical program is almost exclusively concerned, for the time being, with that war. When at length World War II has been shelved and labelled, the standards and concepts which underlie the Marine historical program of today will be equally applicable to the hardly begun tasks of bringing into being an official history of other days than 1941-1945.

At this juncture it might be well to look backward a few paragraphs to the previous enumeration of what an ideal military historical program consists. Against that yardstick let us see how — as of today — the Marine Corps stands.

(1) The first task of an ideal military historical effort, we set forth, was *maintenance of historical archives*. Although, for physical and security reasons, archives constitute the present great bottleneck of Marine Corps history, the Corps is at last on the long road to possessing a really comprehensive, well organized archive. Moreover, it promises to be a living one, with measures taken for continual input<sup>3</sup> and corresponding outflow of ex-

<sup>3</sup>It has only been within the past three years that firm measures have made it mandatory for all Marine Corps agencies to funnel historical records through the Historical Division for disposal. As late as 1946, various divisions in Marine Corps Headquarters were independently and indiscriminately destroying records or packing them up in mixed, unsorted bulk, and calling for the National Archives to take them away — a practice hardly conducive to the orderly organization of records pertinent to the history of the Corps.

ploited, screened material to the National Archives of the United States. Archives space, for the first time since 1943 (and largely owing to the dynamic attack on this congenital problem by BrigGen John T. Selden, while Director of Public Information) is probably adequate. Considering that, as late as 1948, structural experts feared that the weight of overcrowded records on the top deck at Headquarters might quite possibly fall through onto the Quartermaster General below, this in itself is an immense step forward. A professional archivist, Mr John W. Porter, has brought National Archives standards and techniques to the Historical Division. In the archives field, making allowances for sheer bulk of work yet to be done, Marine Corps history is on its feet.

Someone, though, is bound to ask — what good are archives anyhow?

Probably the best answer to this question is the fact that during each month of a sample quarter in 1947, slightly more than 150 queries requiring archives research were received by the Historical Section. These queries, originating from the general public, historical scholars, or manifold U. S. Government agencies, did not include the numerous additional instances in which representatives of other Marine Corps Headquarters elements sought and obtained archives access to conduct their own research.

(2) *Preparation and publication of definitive official narratives* is the second major function which an Armed Forces historical agency should carry out. To meet this requirement the Marine Corps has at length embarked on a comprehensive program covering the history of World War II. For a number of reasons, it has seemed logical to prepare and publish in paperbacked preliminary form what we might call "first wave" official narratives of the major Marine operations, these paperbacks to be followed and drawn together by compilation into a five-volume *Operational History of the Marine Corps in World War II*. Four of the first series (which will include 14 works in all<sup>4</sup>) have already been published (the monographs dealing with Wake, Midway, Tarawa, and Bougainville), and a fifth, *The Guadalcanal Campaign*, is now at the printers. Work on the Saipan monograph, the Palau narrative, and the Philippine air account are well underway, while Okinawa — because of technical difficulties — remains more than half completed, but with an indefinite publication date.

In due course, all the material given preliminary publication in the monograph series will be subjected to final editing, and, together with much additional text on

We understand and acknowledge that the Commanding General, Sixth Marine Division, and the Deputy Commander, Eleventh Chinese War Area, are the duly authorized representatives of the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and that we will immediately and completely carry out and put into effect his orders and instructions.

In case of conflict or ambiguity between the English text of this document and any translation thereof, the English text shall govern.

Signed at Tsingtao  
on the 25th day of October  
1945 by Command and in behalf of the Emperor  
of Japan and the Japanese Government.

*Nagano Eiji*  
Accepted at Tsingtao on the 25th day of October  
1945 for China, the United States, Great Britain and the Union  
of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the interest of the other  
United Nations at war with the Japanese.  
For the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek  
*Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr.*  
Major General, United States Marine Corps  
Commanding, Sixth Marine Division  
*Chen Shih-han*  
Major General, Chinese Army  
Deputy Commander Eleventh Chinese War Area

Original Japanese surrender document received by MajGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., at Tsingtao.

intervening operations not warranting separate monographs, will form the *Operational History of the Marine Corps in World War II*. Moreover at the insistence of the Director of Marine Corps and of Naval History, a Marine officer has been charged with initiation of the official amphibious historical studies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(3) *Operation of a reference library* constitutes, we said, another task for the military historical unit. In this respect, starting from nothing flat as of late 1946 — and due to vision and foresight by the Director of Public Information during his control of the then Historical Section — the Historical Division now maintains a respectable, though minute, reference library. This little collection is immediately and especially necessary to the historians in light of the lack of any official library in the parent headquarters.

(4) *Applied research* (which is only a fancy phrase for looking things up) remains now, as steadily over the past, a Historical Division *forte*. Earlier, we took note of the high monthly volume of queries which require archives research; it is these which, in terms of personnel-time constitute one of the Division's heaviest "fixed charges." This is especially so because the Archives, with their immense back-log<sup>5</sup> must be maintained by the same Civil Service team which, wearing another hat,

<sup>4</sup>The paperbacked series will include, when completed, monographs dealing with Wake, Midway, Guadalcanal, Bougainville and the Northern Solomons, Tarawa, the New Britain Campaign, the Marshalls, Saipan, Tinian, Guam, the Palau, Marine air operations in the Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. All have been or will be published by the U. S. Government Printing Office, and offered for sale by the Superintendent of Documents.

<sup>5</sup>The present estimated back-log of the Marine Corps Archives is 2,190 man-days. This figure increased steadily from 1946 to 1949 because of the highly adverse combination of lack of work-space, lack of personnel, and increased influx and use of records. Paradoxically enough, improvement seems in sight. It is one of those situations which had to get worse before it got better.



Maj Carl W. Hoffman, in preparing the Saipan monograph, consults with LtCol Gayle. Monographs are first presented in mimeograph form for review by key participants.

loyally struggles away to "look things up" for all comers. Queries range anywhere from those to settle barroom arguments ("I say the 3rd MarDiv was the best in the FMF — my buddy says No, the 4th was — which of us is right?") to highly involved and serious questions by scholars. Random samples from all classes have included:

Did the Marine Corps invent dive-bombing?

Prepare a documented historical summary of Marine wardog training and selection.

Please forward a list of subversive organizations on the Attorney General's list.

Can you give us a brief biographical sketch of Archibald Henderson?

Is it true that, in his action reports, Gen MacArthur "forgot" all Marine units serving in the Philippines?

Obviously, the time consumed in answering such questions is both ball-and-chain and headache to the Historical Division, and is one unhappy legacy of its past association with Public Information, which sometimes tended to think of the Historical Section — especially during the early days of the relationship — as a Heaven-sent catchall for looking up chores. On the other hand, the thoroughness, promptitude, and courtesy with which every such request, high or low, is dealt with constitute very proper credit items for the Marine Corps as a whole. On this basis, therefore, applied research (sigh!) probably pays its way.

(5) *Encouragement of semi-official or private research on Marine Corps matters* is an especially rewarding and fruitful field, because, in a nutshell, it gets someone else to do part of the Historical Division's work.

The spread of ventures which the Division has engaged in along these lines ranges all the way from backing up major projects (such as the Princeton-Marine Corps History projects) to guiding civilian graduate students into choice of thesis-topics. Marine officers who find themselves either inclined or required to perform scholarly research tasks are increasingly turning to the Historical Division for guidance; students at Marine Corps Schools seek advice almost daily as to monograph topics which would meet their own experiences and interest, and yet constitute some

values to the Corps. Moreover, as the Marine Corps records become progressively more usable and better explored, it is going to be increasingly easy for the Historical Division to dangle tempting research-topics before scholars, both inside and outside the service. Of course an obvious — and often time-consuming — postulate duty arising from this function is the task of critical review which sometimes rests heavy on the Historical Division. Manuscripts of books, articles and theses often seem to flood the Division, each demanding careful and authoritative check and recheck.

Examples of private publications on or related to Marine subjects, which have received varying degrees of Historical Division support, are:

*Rising Sun in the Pacific* (Volume III of Capt S. E. Morison's operational history of the U. S. Navy in World War II).

All the semi-official Marine Division and Aviation histories (except the 4th, which was published during the immediate postwar nadir of the Historical Section).

*Hit the Beach!* (popular pictorial history of Marines in World War II).

*The Island War* (popular history of Marine Pacific campaigns).

*Coral and Brass* (memoirs of Gen H. M. Smith).

In answer to repeated questions on the subject, it is perhaps pertinent to add that the Historical Division had nothing to do with Mr Fletcher Pratt's *The Marines' War*, nor was the Division ever consulted by Mr Pratt.

(6) *Arrangements for collection, preservation, and display of historical objects* is one field in which, through little fault of its own, the Historical Division has accomplished very little. The Marine Corps Museum, as we

have noted, was founded in 1940 with no administrative tie to what should have been its parent organization, and nine years later, the Museum's status is still officially undefined, being operated under a sort of *de facto* (rather than *de jure*) management by Quantico's Special Services organization. In some of its very scant spare time, the Historical Section has arranged World War II exhibits for the U. S. National Museum in Washington, but that is about as far as the Marine Corps has ventured into what constitutes an important, virtually untried field. Stocks of Marine combat art, for example, remain stored away in Philadelphia, lacking only curatorial attention to ensure their display and exhibit. A logical line for the Corps to pursue in this field would be to draw together all curatorial responsibilities within the Corps (over Museum, combat art, and all other tangible memorabilia) under special staff supervision of the Historical Division. Such a course has already been advantageously pursued by the Navy Department, which boasts a functionary known as the Navy Department Curator, a member of the office of Naval History. Until some such development, however, the Marine Corps will remain unavoidably handicapped in an important aspect of its proper historical responsibilities.

(7) The last functional task of a balanced historical program looks toward the future. It is *establishment of a historical specialist component in the Marine Corps Reserve.*

Readers who have progressed this far must have been struck, in looking back over the Historical Section's past, at the consistently amateur management of Marine historical enterprises. This might have been satisfactory two decades ago in a very small Corps, but the idea that just anyone could operate a large-scale military historical program collapsed with no uncertainty during World War II.<sup>6</sup> The obvious preventive against repetition of those blunders has been the present policy of building up a group of professional historians in the Marine Corps Reserve. These men, mainly university teachers, but

<sup>6</sup>Some observers may rejoin that the management of the Historical Section and Division since World War II has been just as amateur as ever. This is true. In time of war, however, the increased load, together with the diminished availability of boardly qualified line officers, dictate changeover to fully professional historical guidance from the Reserve.

including a number of writers, will constitute the backbone of any future combat historical coverage which events may require. Moreover, the policy has already been settled (and selection actually made) that a professional historian of national standing will, upon mobilization, assume duties as Director of Marine Corps History. To assure correct employment of the historical officers whom this individual will control, new Fleet Marine Force tables of organization include a Force historical platoon for each Fleet Marine Force. The idea is by no means new, having been conceived by the history-conscious *Wermacht* prior to World War II, but it nevertheless represents a constructive and long step forward for the Marine Corps.

The four years following the past war have represented a cumulative turning-point in the historical policy of the Marine Corps. These years have seen definite establishment of long-term Marine Corps policies covering most, if not all matters of historical importance. To make certain that these policies are consistently and wisely pursued, only two essentials are required, namely, that high-grade, carefully selected, combat-experienced officers continue to be assigned to the Historical Division; and that the published output of the Historical Division be of a quality to command the attention and support of the Marine Corps public at large.

In 1949 increasingly, as since 1945, a first line in inter-service defense has been the record. And upon this record our Corps has perforce laid its stake. For the defense of the Marine Corps that we know and love, and for the perpetuation on record of the soldierly qualities which have made our Corps outstanding and unique in the U. S. Armed Forces, Marine historians deserve your best support.

USMC

Assistant Archivist, Mr John Porter, has set up operational records in cross-indexed folders. For first time most records are now organized for research and reference.



NOTICE TO OUR READERS:  
 Without your criticism we have no way of knowing whether or not the GAZETTE is hitting the mark; therefore, we will sincerely appreciate your remarks on the form provided below.

THE EDITORS.  
 Date 5 January 1950

From: LtCol Roger Willock (05447), USMCR.  
 As a reader of the Marine Corps GAZETTE for over 14 years, the following comments and suggestions are offered in the interest of improving the editorial and professional aspects of its columns.

Comments contained in attached manuscript.  
 Respectfully submitted,  
 Roger Willock

**IT IS THE WRITER'S PERSONAL OPINION THAT THERE** is absolutely nothing wrong with the Marine Corps GAZETTE, but that there is definitely something remiss on the part of some of its readers and/or members of the Marine Corps Association. This rather outstanding failing can best be described as an apparent disinclination by a majority of those officers of the rank of colonel or above to contribute to the professional magazine of their own Corps. True, there have been several notable exceptions; however, for the most part officers of the aforementioned category have usually limited their contributions to comment in the *Message Center* rather than in the submission of articles for publication.

Unfortunately, this defect has deprived many of the younger and less senior commissioned officers of the Marine Corps not only of the professional benefits to be gained by the reading of the experiences, theories, and considered opinions of their superior, but also of a great deal of reading pleasure *per se*. When one considers that many of the more senior officers of the Corps, due to their relatively long and often colorful service careers, at one time or another have taken part in unusual assignments at home as well as overseas, it is indeed most regrettable that the written accounts of their participations in out-of-the-ordinary details have largely gone unheralded. It is admitted that in some cases security has been a primary deterrent. In many others modesty on the part of the participant has been a restraining influence (the "Why Should I Blow My Horn" group), and that in some instances possible fear of criticism by contemporaries (the "Why Should I Stick My Neck Out" school) has dampened literary enthusiasm. Nevertheless, one cannot help but feel that the basic explanation lies in the lack of willingness to make the efforts otherwise known as being a charter member of the "Where Am I Going to Find Time" fraternity.

**By LtCol Roger Willock**

# Respectfully Submitted

To illustrate the writer's principal contentions, the record of the Marine Corps GAZETTE for the calendar years 1948 and 1949 bears out some direct evidence as shown by Figure 1.

The inference to be drawn from the above statistics is that the ratio of the relative rank of the authors to the number of articles published results in the equation, "The Higher, The Fewer."

That the GAZETTE has long been aware of the paucity of contributors from the commissioned ranks of the Corps was made quite evident in an editorial comment in the June 1948 *Message Center*:

*"GAZETTE policy does not permit sniping from the cover of anonymity. Pseudonyms are used rarely and then only to cover up the rather embarrassing fact that but six or seven Marine officers seem willing to contribute regularly to the professional magazine of the Corps. Maybe the others don't need the three cents per word."*

Based on the data contained in the tables, 1949 showed some improvement over its predecessor not only with regard to the number of authors but also with reference to those of field grade. Let us hope that the trend will continue, particularly in the case of the higher ranking officers.

**IN AN EFFORT** to render appropriate credit where credit is due, it is the writer's personal opinion that without exception the relatively few articles, written by officers of the rank of colonel or above and published by the GAZETTE in 1948 and 1949, were excellent and covered a variety of subjects. In answer to Lt Reavis' *Why Not a Marine Corps Academy* (GAZETTE, April 1948), Col Hudnall's *A Reply to Mr Reavis* (GAZETTE, July 1948) was brilliantly (and fairly) executed. It remained only for Col Snedeker to complete the devastatingly frontal lobotomy on Lt Reavis' acutely ailing brain-child by the publication of his most comprehensive and complete *The Basic School* (GAZETTE, January 1949).

Aside from Capt Villiers' series of background articles

## YEAR 1948

Rank of the Author of the Published Article	Number of Articles Published	Number of Authors
2nd Lt	4	3
1st Lt	6	6
Capt	12	8
Major	20	17
LtCol	12	11
Col	5	4
General Officers	2	2

## YEAR 1949

Rank of the Author of the Published Article	Number of Articles Published	Number of Authors
2nd Lt	5	4
1st Lt	5	3
Capt	14	13
Major	15	13
LtCol	34	24
Col	8	7
General Officers	0	0

NOTE: Not included above are published articles written by:

- 1) Officials of the Marine Corps GAZETTE.
- 2) Officers of other branches of the U. S. Armed Services.
- 3) Foreign officers.
- 4) *Base Plate McGurk*—6 articles in 1948, 1 in 1949.

Figure 1

on the Near East and Indo-China, Col Curry's *Background for Palestine* (GAZETTE, June 1948) and *Strategic Palestine* (GAZETTE, October 1948) in the writer's opinion were both interesting and well written articles of timely interest. The same may be said of Col Berry's *The Oil Snarl* (GAZETTE, February and March 1949).

WHILE on the subject of the relative worth of background articles, reference is made to a criticism of Lt Peterson's *Antarctic—International Grab Bag* (GAZETTE, April 1949) published in the June 1949 *Message Center*. Bypassing the observation that it is usually far easier to criticize another's work than to write a construction article on the same subject, it would appear that the critic missed a fundamental issue in his condemnation not only of the Lieutenant's choice of topic but also of the GAZETTE's policy in publishing background articles. By way of enlightenment, Lt Peterson's (and the GAZETTE's) critic might do well to ponder over the following extract from the introduction to Fletcher Pratt's *Eleven Generals*:

"... soldiers get enough official gobbledegook in their manuals and regulations, and when they are called upon

*to take money out of their own pockets for a professional magazine they expect to receive something that can be read with a certain amount of pleasure, even if it does deal with technical subjects."*

An additional factor favoring the publication of background articles in the GAZETTE is the use of such material for training purposes in certain of the recently formed Marine Corps Reserve Volunteer Training Units. Based on the writer's experiences with his local intelligence unit, several of these articles in abridged form have been used as the basis of a series of lectures, and have aroused considerably favorable interest among the participants.

Today, perhaps more than at any other time in its history, the Marine Corps is widely represented. Many of our officers and men are attending specialized service schools, and due to the constantly changing international situation Marines are currently serving afloat with naval task forces in the Mediterranean and the Far East as well as ashore in other equally strategic localities. Security permitting, let us hear from them through the medium of their own professional journal, the Marine Corps GAZETTE.

US MC

# Passing in Review

## BOOKS OF INTEREST TO MARINE READERS

### Naval Operations—Volume IV . . .

CORAL SEA, MIDWAY AND SUBMARINE ACTIONS, MAY 1942-AUGUST 1942. Samuel Eliot Morison. 307 pages, illustrated, 18 charts, indexed. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. \$6.00.

Capt Samuel Eliot Morison combines in a single person one of the eminent historians of our era and one of the best qualified blue-water sailors now in practice—"sailor all his life and a historian for 30 years," as the jacket blurb truly puts it on this admirable Volume IV of his *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*.

From such an author (whom President Roosevelt was farsighted enough to entrust with the task of telling our Navy's wartime story), we may expect the kind of quality which *Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions* gives us—but before we talk about this latest volume of Capt Morison's project, it might be well to examine the frame of reference into which the work falls.

*Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions* is the fourth volume of what will be a 13-volume series covering definitively the story of U.S. naval operations in the past war. Although both author and Navy Department are at some pains to emphasize that this is not—at any rate by strait-laced, technical criteria—an *official* history of the Navy, it is as near to any official story as the Navy will ever present; and in its preparation, Capt Morison has received not only unlimited access and official blessing, but the services of an able staff, both officer and enlisted, from the Navy Department. On the other hand, the author demanded and was granted, not without occasional misgiving perhaps, total latitude of opinion and evaluation, so that the History's conclusions, happily, are always straight Morison.

As a matter of record, this is a proper place to add that, so far, he has brought out three able and scholarly predecessors to this newest work, viz., *The Battle of the Atlantic, Operations in North African Waters*, and *The Rising Sun in the Pacific*.

Having thus disposed of the parent series, let us examine this particular volume.

As its title tells us, *Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions* recounts the story of our pivotal naval actions in mid-1942. Moreover—and this will be of great interest to Marine Corps readers—it sets the stage for the Guadalcanal campaign in three final chapters which take us

through the tortuous, crucial plans and inter-service jockeying preliminary to that August day when ready U.S. Marines launched America's first offensive of World War II.

Capt Morison's treatment of the Battle of Midway is in all probability definitive. Aided by a free-running style and by the most minute and exhaustive research imaginable, he produces once and for all the picture of what happened to America's fortunes on what he so rightly terms "The glorious Fourth of June." And in this, although he holds staunchly to his conclusion that Marine air, for all its gallantry and its losses, did little to cripple the Japanese fleet, he does more than friendly justice to the Marine Corps as a whole.

This of course prompts a question which many Marine readers are sure to ask: Precisely how, and on what basis, does the Marine Corps fit into a history of naval operations?

The answer—or so it seems to this reviewer—is that Capt Morison has wisely refused any literal responsibility for telling the Marine Corp's story *in toto*, just because the Corps happens to constitute one of the two services within the Naval Establishment. He has, in fact, approached the matter of Marine operational history in the same way as the Unification Act has approached Marine operations. Wherever Marine Corps units appear, "incident to a naval campaign," they receive close scrutiny and full appraisal from Morison. In this volume, incidentally, as in *Rising Sun in the Pacific*, he has made good use, it would seem, of the official monographs in our Historical Division's current series, and here, as before, he has given them generous billing in the footnotes.

The Navy comes in for blistering treatment on the subject of poor torpedoes, a point to which Captain Morison adverts time and again. This quotation from one exasperated 1942 submariner will serve to convey the feelings which the author makes plain:

"to make round trips of 8500 miles into enemy waters to gain attack positions undetected within 800 yards of enemy ships only to find that torpedoes run deep and over half the time will fail to function, seems to me an undesirable manner of gaining information which might be determined any morning within a few miles of a torpedo station in the presence of comparatively few hazards."

And as for the Japanese, while on the subject of submarine operations, the book conveys a salient lesson for every student of the fate of navies in any system while a

### single service achieves dominance:

"But the mortal blow to a successful (Japanese) undersea war was the Japanese Army's discovery, during the Solomons campaign, that the boats could carry supplies to isolated garrisons. Thenceforth, more and more submarines were pulled off patrols to serve the Army with rice and ammunition. . . The Navy hated that sort of employment but it was overruled in Tokyo . . . warfare, one thing stands out like the rising sun—misconceptions in the topmost minds of the military and naval hierarchy."

Still another example of Capt Morison's astringent touch is his notable debunking of Alaska as a possible avenue for invasion, either air or ground, against the United States (or for our use against Eurasia). To those who still quake at the possibility of major trans-polar or trans-Bering invasion of the United States (a favorite theme of cocktail strategists, as Morison points out), the history quotes the late Gen Simon Bolivar Buckner, USA (an alumnus of hard Aleutian campaigning): "They might make it, but it would be their grandchildren who finally got there; and by then they would all be American citizens anyway!"

But for the Marine readers, as suggested earlier, the meat of this meaty, salty volume, may well be found in the three chapters (XII, XIII, and XIV) which cover the Guadalcanal planning, and the initial landings on Guadalcanal and Tulagi by Fleet Marine Force units under Gen Vandegrift.

In these chapters, *Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions* comes up with such nuggets as the full perspective of Adm King's magnificently stubborn insistence on the need for Guadalcanal right then and there—even if Marines were the only ready U.S. amphibious troops who could do it; of Gen Marshall's insistence (as previously in the Iceland expedition) that, despite 100 percent Marine Corps and Navy troop participation, Guadalcanal operations be under Army command; of Gen MacArthur's opposition and predictions of dire disaster regarding the forthcoming Guadalcanal offensive; of Adm Nimitz's impulse to try capturing Tulagi in May—employing *only* the 1st Raider Battalion (whose commanding officer Capt Morison subsequently mentions in these terms: "No finer officer than Merritt A. Edson ever wore the Anchor and Globe").

In any history, especially one so compact and fact-crammed as this, there are bound to be minor points at which one must note exception.

Marines, for all their comradely respect toward submariners, will never concede Capt Morison's judgment (p. 189) that the submarine service was ". . . even more than naval aviation and the Marines, a corps d'élite." Nor will sweat-stained graduates of the old 4th Defense Battalion (first FMF unit to reach the South Pacific), who occupied the New Hebrides in March 1942, be happy to find their arrival date listed two months later as May of the same year. Similarly, the account of the initial landings on Espiritu Santo on 28 May speaks of Army feats and what "the soldiers" did, but omits the presence

of the provisional force of Marines under whose guns development of that crucial base proceeded safely. Nor were the amphibian tractors at Guadalcanal novel or experimental, as one might suppose from page 285. The vehicles had been under Marine Corps development and sponsorship since 1940, and came to Guadalcanal as organic equipment of a regularly organized Marine amphibian tractor battalion. Finally, to avert future apoplexies, it might be well if page 282 were rectified to show that the "alligator shoulder patch" which indeed became the hallmark of successful amphibious battles was that worn by the Marines of Gen Holland Smith's V Amphibious Corps, and was in no way a possession of any Navy organization or of Adm Turner.

But such corrections are small indeed. In *Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions*, we have a splendidly written piece of maritime history, well illustrated and charted. Marines who fail to acquire the Morison habit while his series is still young will be missing the bet of a lifetime.

RDH, Jr.

### Behind the Curtain . . .

THE COUNTRY OF THE BLIND: The Soviet System of Mind Control, by George S. Counts and Nucia Lodge. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 368 pages. \$4.00.

The title of *Country of the Blind* is taken from a short story by H. G. Wells, which tells of a community in the Andes locked in a fertile valley by a landslide. After a disease had wiped out the sight of the community, the memory of sight vanished through the generations. The people constructed a religion and a cosmogony of their own to account for the only world that they knew. A traveler who fell into the valley endeavored to tell them something of the outside world and the wonders of vision. He was, however, regarded as a dangerous heretic and forced by imprisonment and hunger to recant and accept the world as the inhabitants knew it.

The authors chose this title as an apt one for a book that consists largely of translated quotations from Soviet writings illustrating the rigidity of control that the Communist Party is exercising over the minds of the Russian people in politics, art, and science; the hatred and fear shown toward the West; and the exaltation of all things Russian. In so far as the book reveals the resolute attempt of the Soviets to build a society in which there shall be no dissent in any field of thought from the principles of dialectical materialism and the Party Line, the title is a happy parallel, but there is one important difference between the mythical valley of Wells and the USSR. The mythical valley was self-contained and self containing; the USSR is not self containing. Dialectical materialism has for its believers the quality of both a science and a religion, and it is a fundamental tenet of that religion that the doctrines of Marx will be accepted by the world. The future as projected by the Russian is that of

a world state dominated by the Communist Party of Russia and directed from the Kremlin. It is often forgotten that Marx was more than a man who devised a unique economical system. He was also an historian who boldly projected the curve of history into the future, and formulated a philosophy that predicted the inevitability of this curve. This philosophy, welded to a resurgent Russian nationalism, strengthened by a Messianic complex, and implemented by the Russian revolutionary doctrines of violence and opportunism, is the present threat to the world.

It is the thesis of this book that since the revolution in 1917 control of Russia has gradually fallen into the hands of men like Stalin who have never had wide acquaintance with or even knowledge of, the thought and philosophy of Europe. These men have since World War II begun a systematic campaign to cut the USSR off from all intellectual contacts with the West. In order to accomplish this isolation, they have assumed complete control over all types of communication within the country and have methodically distorted all knowledge coming into it so that the Russian people will learn only what is in accord with dialectical materialism, namely, that capitalism is imperialistic, but decadent and dying.

The quotations show a progressive revision of literature, music, science, and education to make not only the present but also the past conform to Marxist philosophy. A history textbook for schools in a second edition issued since the war has eliminated almost all references to the part the Allies played in that war; writers of historical dramas or novels are censured for having pictured the past as not consonant with the Communist doctrine. This description of the amputation of the historical past is perhaps the most appalling part of the book. It means simply that a great people may soon have no bearings whatsoever pointing toward the truth.

While they prove their thesis, the authors raise insistent questions: Four hundred million people can through systematic control of information be forged into a monolithic cultural block. The direction of the block lies in the hands of very few men. What are the intentions of these men and what are their capabilities? Will they have to roll this block into war to preserve their power?

Next, since modern civilization depends on science, what is the significance of the Soviets putting science under the control of a political philosophy? Will such action weaken and debilitate scientific research and eventually hinder the progress of applied science? Here is the most puzzling enigma of all. A layman is somewhat out of his depth in discussing science but this seems to be the situation in Russia: The USSR has deliberately exalted Lysenko and adopted his doctrine that acquired characteristics can be inherited. The doctrine is, of course, beautifully suited to Communist theory which does believe that it can alter man's very nature to con-

form with its tenets. It also has immediate value in that Lysenko apparently claims that he can within a plant generation produce food plants adaptable to varying climatological conditions and capable of being reproduced through seed. The triumph of Lysenko would theoretically mean the end of the study of genetics as the West knows it and the end of careful plant or animal breeding. Again, the quantum theory with its principle of indeterminacy has been assailed as "bourgeois" or idealistic science and opposed to Marxist science. Since the quantum theory is necessary to the pursuit of research in pure science, rejection of that theory would hinder research and eventually hamstring applied science. Are the men in Russia actually subordinating science to political philosophy or are they shrewdly using these attacks on science as window dressing?

The quotations in this book show that control of communications can change a whole people's concept of the world. But will that change be permanent and vital or will it in the long run crumble when it comes in contact with reality?

The authors of this book do not pretend to answer these questions; they have served a sufficiently useful purpose in bringing before the American public these translations which represent the Soviets' official point of view and reveal the bases of Soviet culture.

PDC

#### Napoleon's Italian Campaign . . .

NAPOLEON IN ITALY 1796-1797—Elijah Adlow, 217 pages, Maps, Index. Boston, Massachusetts: William J. Rochefort, Publisher. \$3.00.

The truth of Napoleon's dictum to read and meditate upon the wars of the greatest captains as the only means of rightly learning the science of war is nowhere better evidenced than in his own first Italian Campaign; for there are few campaigns whose histories are as replete with professional instruction as this, the first campaign conducted by Napoleon as an independent commander.

Jomini, who was the first to deduce the principles of war from history, based his first treatise on the campaigns of Frederick the Great; however, it was not until he had carefully studied this campaign that he was fully convinced of the correctness of his theory of war. Clausewitz, too, than whom no man has had greater influence on the conduct and the nature of the great wars of our own century, carefully analyzed this campaign in the formulation of his monumental doctrines. Rich in example, the lessons of the campaign of 1796, have been fully exploited by latter day military analysts and instructors. Both Foch, in his *Principles of War* and Hamley, in his influential *Operations of War*, utilize this campaign for exposition and proof of the fundamental principle of economy of force.

While serving as Professor of Military Art and History at the British Staff College, the late Col G. F. R. Hender-

son, whose classic life of "Stonewall" Jackson may be found today, after more than a half century, in the book lists of our professional journals, delivered a lecture in which he recommended the campaign of 1796 in Italy as one of the campaigns which an officer might well study throughout "the course of a single winter" and "could not fail to profit by this study."

It is not difficult to understand Col Henderson's recommendation; for, though many of Napoleon's subsequent campaigns exceeded his first in scale, none of them surpassed it in brilliancy, and strategical combinations; nor do any of them better illustrate the efficacy of initiative, simplicity, economy of force, rapidity of movement, and dynamic leadership. A more specific example of the practical value of a study of this campaign is that, accounts of operations in mountainous terrain validate completely the soundness of every principle of our doctrine concerning combat at defiles as laid down in the field service regulations.

The author, jurist by vocation and soldier by avocation, also originally gathered the material in the present book as a medium for practical military instruction of the officers of the 26th (Yankee) Division, and presented it in a series of lectures prior to its publication in this more formal form.

It is not equal to the long out of print *Napoleon Bonaparte's First Campaign* of Col Sargent, either in readability or as a strict military analysis. However, the minuteness of detail, particularly in time and space factors, indicates that a good deal more than "one winter" of research was needed to collect the data presented here.

It is this compilation of detailed facts that enhances its value as a professional text for the military reader. However, in this respect, there is a fatal flaw in that no good map of the theater of operations, either fold-in or separate from the text, is provided. The maps it does contain are simple sketches, scattered throughout the text, and cluttered up with broad arrows inscribed with the names of various division commanders, which serve mainly to distract the reader. However, if the reader, with professional interest, first provides himself with an adequate map to lay out before him, it is believed that, in the words of Col Henderson, he cannot "fail to profit by this study."

CSN

### Fate of the World . . .

THE STRUGGLE FOR GERMANY—Drew Middleton. 296 pages. Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc.: New York-Indianapolis.

I first met Drew Middleton in the Fort Sumter Hotel one early June night in 1941 when the 1st Marine Brigade was lying in Charleston getting ready for the Iceland junket. A big, hulking man, he had been a war correspondent since 1939 and was to continue as such until the end of the war. He then became Chief Correspondent in Germany for the New York *Times*. Between that assign-

ment and his coverage of the Nuremberg Trials, he was the *Times'* correspondent in the USSR. This man gets around.

In his preface to his latest book *The Struggle For Germany* Drew Middleton says: "The intention of this book is to demonstrate that Germany is the most important single problem of American foreign policy and that the fate of the world may rest on the direction Germany takes. There are no easy answers to the internal problem in Germany or the struggle for Germany's future. One of the major detriments to clear political thinking in our times is the habit, which we have caught from the totalitarians, of thinking in terms of black and white. . ."

Regardless of where the habit may have come from (and I don't necessarily agree that it came from the totalitarians) it is a great pity that the German problem *can't* be resolved to a simple clear-cut statement of black's black, and white's white—and let there be no nonsense about it. But it simply isn't that easy and the sooner we realize it the better off we, and our children (and their children), will be. To many Americans, perhaps to most Americans, Germany is a bewildering, unreliable, trouble-making sore spot. Twice in one generation Germany has had to be slapped down; having been slapped down, and very thoroughly this last time, we are now spending vast sums to rebuild the shattered German economy. Our attitude towards this expensive commitment is rather as though we had taken on, God only knows why, the support of a shady character with a long police record. Having made the proper arrangements for food, clothing, and the other necessities, we ask only not to be bothered further, we're paying for his upkeep, aren't we?

Let's not fool ourselves. As *The Struggle For Germany* is at pains to point out, we are not simply being altruistic when we spend our treasure in rebuilding Germany. It is becoming increasingly apparent that Germany, as well as the welfare of Germany, are both essential to the western European powers and to the United States of America. There is a very real war taking place within Germany today between the ideologies of the East and the West. On the outcome of that war will rest the eventual future of Germany, and, perhaps, our own country. If Germany is to be built up as a bulwark against the further spread of Communism, then is there not the danger of again allowing her the opportunity of being the instigator of another one of the world conflicts which she has managed to start twice in one generation? The danger is admittedly present, but Middleton believes that this possibility can be controlled and that conditions following World War II in Germany in no way resemble those that existed after World War I. In that latter conflict German economy was virtually untouched and no fighting took place on German soil. During World War II, however, the Third Reich was the scene of some of the most desperate fighting that the long history of war in Europe has witnessed. The un-

paralled assault from the air obliterated complete sections of some of Germany's greatest cities; the destruction must be seen to be believed. The morality of such indiscriminate warfare is seriously open to question, but the point here is simply that because of the widespread disruption of the national economy it is not within the bonds of practical realities that Germany, for a long time to come, will be industrially powerful enough to undertake a war of aggression. But it is exactly the fear of this possibility that explains to a very large degree the stubbornness of the French towards any proposition by the British and ourselves that the heavy industry of Germany should be allowed to once again be self-supporting. Failure to exploit what might initially have become an impasse in Anglo-American and French relations was probably one of the most monumental errors that the Russians have made in their amazingly inept handling of the whole German problem. The entire Russian approach to wooing the Germans has been so bad that Communism in Germany is not regarded by the majority of Germans as a very attractive bill of goods at this time, though we cannot allow ourselves to be lulled into a false sense of security for this reason. The possibility of an out and out use of force by the Communists to achieve what cannot be foisted on an unwilling German electorate is just the thing that makes the whole situation so ticklish.

Middleton examines in detail the events that have taken place in the period from 1945-1949 and shows how they have contributed to the conflict taking place within Germany today. One of the major weaknesses in our policy towards Germany has been the fact that while we were quite positive what we did not want Germany to be, we were not clear as to what we did have in mind for Germany to be, we were not clear as to what we did have in mind for Germany from a positive point of view. There has been a gradual veering of opinion in regard to the administration's handling of Germany that has carried from the Morgenthau plan almost to the other extreme. Whether this change in course is a good thing remains to be seen. The chances are that it is a sound approach. Certainly the Russians with their apparently unsatiated appetite for reparations in kind and in cash are not winning any friends and are influencing people to the view that the occupying powers in Western Germany offer a better deal than can be found in Eastern Germany.

The author, however, has no illusions about the Germans and the German character. Middleton is quite aware of their natural inclination for a highly regimented and disciplined way of life and the effect that such preference can have on the Germany that eventually emerges. He notes that a recent poll showed that over 50 per cent of the Germans quizzed replied that they thought National Socialism (Hitler) was a good idea, but that it had been badly implemented (the victims of the gas ovens and the concentration camps are probably muttering angrily that

the poll did not cover a wide enough field).

*The Struggle For Germany* is well and painstakingly written; so far as I can determine it is straightforward and honest. The author has no cure-all to sell; he contents himself with stating facts and from these facts he draws reasonable conclusions. Hollywood will never make an offer for the screen rights for *The Struggle for Germany*, but every American with the slightest pretensions towards appreciating the German problem and its effect on the whole precarious international situation would do well to read this book. It should be required reading for the professional military man. RMcCT

#### Democratic Philosophy . . .

THIS I DO BELIEVE—David E. Lilienthal, 208 pages. New York: Harper and Brothers. \$2.50

On 3 February 1947, the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, then considering the confirmation of David E. Lilienthal as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, heard an extemporaneous statement portraying a patriotic American's concept of democracy. These remarks will, eventually, take their rightful place beside the great speeches of Webster, Ingersoll and Bryan. Of this fact there is little doubt. The magnificent reception given this speech in the country's press, radio, political harangues, and cracker-barrel conversations has already given the Lilienthal statement the element of timelessness.

Mrs Lilienthal, sensing with a woman's perception the impact of the statement upon American political thought, therefore prevailed upon her husband to amplify and extend his remarks regarding his interpretation of the democratic philosophy and its application in American life. This book is the result of what must have been her constant urgings.

*This I Do Believe* defines democracy as a way of life—not simply a form of Government, a matter of laws, a cast ballot, a right of free speech and press. Lilienthal's democracy concerns itself with fundamental principles of human conduct—centuries old and trial worn. We must measure our democratic precepts, not by the glibly spoken word or the machinations of political and military tinkerers, but by commonplace standards of ordinary everyday pursuits. Evaluation of democracy may be made solely after an utterly exhaustive analysis of society not only in great cities of our nation but also in our small towns and villages where, too, democracy has real substance.

Sanguine thinking and optimistic conviction leads David Lilienthal to a conclusion that despite present danger signals, despite rough going, our democratic system not only flourishes but also is steadily growing—ever progressing toward the idealistic goal of the political dreamer, the chimerical Utopian State. Advocates of political philosophies diametrically opposed to our's often seize upon small, insignificant, and relatively unimportant

aspects of American democracy's failures or shortcomings, magnifying them out of all proportion to their real effect on our system. The resultant unrest among our own people and distrust of our intentions by peoples of other lands consequently leads to internal and external complications and misunderstandings. Lack of support by American citizens and unbounded foreign criticism of the democratic system is inevitable.

Accordingly, it behooves those who place their trust in and support democratic theory to extend themselves in protecting and nurturing our way of life—supporting and improving it—making it always go forward until it shall become the preeminent philosophy for all peoples of the world.

Lilienthal's entire philosophy is based on the ethical and spiritual approach to democracy. He is convinced that the wellsprings of our vitality are found in individual integrity and dignity, and that the constitutional guarantee of personal freedom and the concerted action of individuals all striving toward the altruistic goal of "good for the whole" have made and will keep America great and strong.

Recently America has become the shield, the bulwark of all freedom loving peoples. Almost alone, the United States stands between the protection of individual dignity and totalitarian oppression. The inevitable result of this new role has been the development of a large and costly peace-time military establishment. Although recognizing with a huge, effective, peace-time military organization will have a decided impact on the economic, social, and political life of the nation, Lilienthal—almost as an immature, fanciful dreamer—apparently fails to see any cause of fear in a powerful military machine. He does not feel that the American way of life for which he prays is in jeopardy; to the citizen-thinker, ever aware of the possible rise of a military dictatorship, this is the one great fault of the book. Mr. Lilienthal, of course, implicitly accepts the constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion, press, and speech. He is certain no American would or could seize control of the U. S. defense organization as long as Congress pulls the purse-strings. This attitude, however, is valid only so long as ambitious politicians in our country are prevented from gaining control of our army, navy, or air force in any way whatever.

Nevertheless, by this work, David Lilienthal marks himself as one of the great political thinkers of our time. Although a rabid idealist and dreamer, Mr. Lilienthal has had sufficient realistic experience through two decades of contact with practicing politicians and economic czars to enable him intelligently to evaluate the democratic system as practiced in this country today. He knows the faults of democracy and does not fail to point out such shortcomings. In spite of these he still firmly believes in the fundamental principles of the democratic system, which—above all—has a deep, all-abiding respect for the

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dignity of the individual.

Mr Lilienthal's book is not great in that it adds significant information to or makes recommendations for world-shaking changes in the democratic philosophy of government and life, for it does neither of these. It will be found useful, however, by Marines who desire to know what their country, their constitution, their way of life means to them as individuals. Herein the Marine learns the extent of his citizenship obligations, which, certainly, he did not lay down when he took up arms as a Marine.

*This I Do Believe* will never displace the *Bible*, *The Upper Room*, or *The Prophet*, as best sellers. It will, notwithstanding, be read repeatedly by politicians floundering about for patriotic-sounding speech material, by preachers seeking a theme on which to base a soul-searching sermon on the social gospel, and by scholars or students striving to learn the real, deep-seated meaning of democracy.

JNR

## Wade Hampton ...

GIANT IN GRAY—Manly Wade Wellman. 387 pages, photographs, bibliography, indexed. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$5.00

Wade Hampton's long and useful life conveniently divides itself into three phases: before the Civil War perhaps the leading planter (and business man) of the Old South; during the war a cavalry leader and successor to "Jeb" Stuart; afterward a master politician and champion against the dark forces of the Reconstruction.

It is with the middle portion, the war years, that military readers will be most concerned. Unfortunately, except for some interesting but rather unimportant anecdotes, Mr Wellman adds little to the cavalry history of the Confederacy that is not adequately set down in *Lee's Lieutenants*—any biographer of a general in the Army of Northern Virginia inevitably must face a devastating comparison with Dr Douglas Southall Freeman's monumental work. In addition, most Marine readers are familiar with Col John W. Thomason, Jr's *Jeb Stuart*. Also unfortunately, there are no maps and without them the reader is left blind on the battlefield.

The most impressive portion of this handsomely produced volume are the seven portraits arranged chronologically, from youth to old age, of Wade Hampton, South Carolina's Grand Seigneur.

EHS

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
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